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The Government, the Legislature and the
Judiciary-Working Towards Remedying the
Problems with the Civil False Claims

Act: Where Do We Go From Here?
Raegan A. McClain*
INTRODUCTION

The civil False Claims Act ("FCA" or "Act") imposes liability
on any "person" who knowingly presents or causes to be
presented a false or fraudulent claim to the United States Government.1 For many years, the FCA has been a successful tool
in combating health care fraud against the government. Since
the 1986 Amendments to the FCA, the Department of Justice
("DOJ") has recovered more than $4 billion in civil fraud cases
brought under the qui tam2 provisions of the Act.3 In 2000
alone, the government won or negotiated over $1.2 billion in
health care fraud cases and proceedings, which resulted in the
government collecting over $717 million, and returning over
$577 million to the Medicare Trust Fund.4
* Ms. McClain is an associate with the Chicago office of Piper, Marbury, Rudnick
& Wolfe where she currently practices corporate health law. The author would like to
thank Henry Casale for inspiring her to write this article, Professor Joan Krause for
her insight, suggestions and comments and her parents, and Mary and Patrick McClain, for their unconditional love and encouragement.
1. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (1994).
2. A qui tam relator is a private individual who brings a lawsuit on behalf of the
government. The word qui tam is derived from the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur" which translates to "[w]ho sues on behalf
of the King as well as for himself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY ABRIDGED 867 (6th

ed. 1991).
3. Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Just., Justice Recovers
Record $1.5 Billion in Fraud Payments Highest Ever for One Year Period (No. 641,
Nov. 2, 2000), at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/November/641.civ.htm (last visited
April 15, 2001); Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Just., Justice
Department Recovers Over $3 Billion in Whistleblowers False Claims Act Awards and
Settlements (No. 79, Feb. 24, 2000), at http://usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2000/February/
079civ.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2001).
4. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. AND U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. HEALTH
CARE FRAUD & ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM, ANN. REP. FOR FY 2000 (Jan. 2001),

available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/ hipaa00ar21.htm (last visited Apr. 16,
2001) [hereinafter "2000 ANNUAL REPORT"]. Although the government won or ne-

gotiated over $1.2 billion in 2000, the government did not collect this total amount in
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There is no doubt that the monetary amounts recovered as a
result of the FCA are impressive. However, beneath the faqade
of dollar signs lies an Act in turmoil. For over a century there
have been conflicting opinions about the purpose and intent of
the FCA. Consequently, Congress has attempted to improve
the Act numerous times in an effort to rectify some of the controversial provisions. Although there have been significant executive, legislative and judicial efforts to decipher vague
provisions of the FCA, there are still fundamental problems
with certain provisions of the Act, as well as how the Act is
enforced.
This paper examines and critiques the roles of the executive,
legislative and judicial branches in influencing the development
and application of the modern FCA. Part I of this paper provides a general overview of the historical development of the
FCA and its current substantive provisions. Part II discusses
and evaluates the government's use of the FCA to target fraud
and abuse in health care, describes criticism of such use, critiques the government's response to this criticism, and suggests
ways in which the government might improve its enforcement
tactics. Part III examines judicial interpretations of the public
disclosure jurisdictional bar of the FCA and explains how these
interpretations have shaped the recent application of the qui
tam provisions of the Act. Part III also attempts to reconcile the
competing interpretations of the qui tam provisions with the intended purpose of the Act. Part IV summarizes and analyzes
legislative attempts to modify the FCA since the 1986 Amendments in order to determine whether past proposals may provide solutions for correcting the Act's current inadequacies.
Additionally, this part offers suggestions for alleviating some of
the harsh provisions of the Act in order to rein in executive
branch leverage over unwitting providers. Finally, the paper
concludes by summarizing how executive, legislative and judicial
efforts might effectively remedy the problems that continue to
foster an inequitable application of the Act.

2000. Id. The actual collected amount of $717 million includes collections from
favorable judgments, negotiations and settlements of previous years. Id.
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I.

OVERVIEW OF THE FALSE CLAIMS

A.

AcT

HistoricalDevelopments

In order to understand the current FCA, it is necessary to understand its historical development. In 1863, President Abraham Lincoln signed into law the Informer's Act, which is today
known as the False Claims Act. This law was designed to combat fraud against the Union Army by defense contractors during
the Civil War. 5 Since its enactment, the FCA has been transformed by two significant amendments-the 1943 and 1986
amendments. As a result of these amendments, the modern
FCA is more broadly applied.
1.

6
The 1863 Act

Although the initial FCA contained nine sections, three sections primarily served as the origins for the modern FCA. Section 1 generally prohibited individuals in the military or naval
service from submitting false claims to the government. 7 Examples of such fraudulent acts included submitting false vouchers
and false oaths, forging signatures, uttering forged papers, conspiring to defraud, stealing or embezzling, delivering false receipts for arms, and purchasing or receiving arms from soldiers.8
An individual committing any such crimes could be arrested and
held for trial by court-martial and, if found guilty, could be pun5. Senator Howard said when introducing the initial Informer's Act:
This bill has been prepared at the urgent solicitation of the officers who are
connected with the administration of the War Department and the Treasury
Department. The country, as we know has been full of complaints respecting the frauds and corruptions practiced in obtaining pay from the Government during the present war; and it is said, and earnestly urged upon our
attention, that further legislation is pressingly necessary to prevent this great
evil ....
CONG. GLOBE, 37th

Cong., 3d Sess. 952 (1863) (statement of Senator Howard). Some
examples of fraudulent acts that were taking place during this time are as follows:
"[c]ontractors would sell the same horses twice to the Army; they would sell sand
instead of gun powder; and sawdust instead of muskets." 144 CONG. REC. S7675-02,
S7676 (daily ed. July 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
6. Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696. The FCA was later split into civil and
criminal components. The civil provisions were reenacted as §§ 3490-3494 of the
Revised Statutes. U.S. Rev. Stat. tit. 36, §§ 3490-3494 (1875). The criminal provisions
were reenacted as § 5438 of the Revised Statutes. U.S. Rev. Stat. tit. 70, § 5438 (1875).
Section § 5438 was repealed in 1909, Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 341, 35 Stat.
1153, and was subsequently revised and codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 287 and 1001, Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 698, 749.
7. Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, § 1.
8.

Id.
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ished by fine or imprisonment and dismissed or discharged from
service. 9
Section 3 applied to individuals not in the military. 10 Such individuals who committed any prohibited fraudulent act were
punished by forfeiting to the government two thousand dollars
per act, plus double the amount of damages sustained by the
government.11 An individual convicted of such crimes could
also be imprisoned between one and five years,
and fined be12
dollars.
thousand
five
and
thousand
one
tween
Section 4 set out court jurisdiction and authorized private persons, who are known today as qui tam relators ("relators"), to
file actions on behalf of the United States. 13 Section 6 set forth
the recovery amount for such qui tam relators. Under the 1863
Act, relators were entitled to half of the amount forfeited by the
guilty defendant, as well as half the amount of the damages collected by the government. 14 Originally, the statute of limitations
provided that any action must be brought 15within six years from
the date the unlawful act was committed.
2.

The 1943 Amendments

Since the 1863 Act did not place limitations on private individuals bringing a lawsuit on behalf of the United States, many
individuals filed "parasitic" lawsuits-lawsuits based on information copied from another source-in the late 1930s. 16 This
practice was the subject of the United States Supreme Court decision in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess.17 In Marcus, a
relator filed an action against the defendant-contractors to recover damages incurred by the government as a result of defendants' collusive bidding on electrical contracts. 18 However,
prior to the filing of the relator's suit, the defendants were indicted and, after entering a plea of nolo contendere, fined for
9. Id. §§ I& 2.
10. Id. § 3.
11. Id.
12. Id. § 3.
13. Id. § 4.
14. Id. § 6.
15. Id. § 7.
16. Cf. 89 CONG. REC. 10845-10846 (1943) (statement of Rep. Walter) ("Now, the

country is literally covered with racketeering suits. As a matter of fact, the latest
count that I had showed 250 cases, in none of which has any service been rendered to
the United States.").
17.
18.

United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
Id. at 539.
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defrauding the government. 19 The government argued that the
relator should be dismissed from the lawsuit because he received the information that served as the basis for his suit from
the indictment, rather than by his own investigation. 20 The relator denied relying on the indictment, arguing that he conducted
an investigation of his own and presented the government with
additional information. 2 1 The Supreme Court recognized the relator's right to sue based on the language of the then-current
version of the Act, which stated that a "[s]uit may be brought
and carried on by any person. '22 The court explained that the
Act did not contain any words of "exception or qualification" to
confine permissible relators to those who betrayed their co-conspirators.23 In fact, based on that language, the Supreme Court
stated that even the district attorney who filed the criminal suit
could qualify as a relator.24 After Marcus, there was an urgency
to amend the Act to prevent individuals from filing suit in situations where the government was already in possession of the information that served as the basis of the complaint.
In response to Marcus, Congress in 1943 enacted the "public
disclosure bar" to prevent qui tam plaintiffs from filing such
"parasitic" lawsuits. In pertinent part, the 1943 Amendments
prohibited a court from having jurisdiction over suits where it
appeared that the information or evidence used by the relator
"[w]as based upon evidence or information in the possession of
the United States, or any agency, officer or employee thereof, at
the time such suit was brought," unless the individual filing the
lawsuit possessed and voluntarily disclosed substantial evidence
19. Id. at 545.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 546 (quoting Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, § 4) (emphasis
added).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. During the debates on the amendments, Representative Walter stated:
We feel that by enacting this compromise legislation the United States will
be amply protected and at the same time there will not be this ever-present
invitation to racketeers to examine indictments, to examine reports of the
Truman committee, or if you please, for dishonest and unscrupulous investigators to turn over information to their friends or co-conspirators for the
purpose of bringing suit against our citizens on information that either
comes to them by reading an indictment or a bill of complaint or through
testimony before some committee or which comes to them in their official
capacity as a representative of the United States.
89 CONG. REC. 10847 (1943) (statement of Rep. Walter).
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or information to the Attorney General which was not previ26
ously in the possession of the Department of Justice ("DOJ").
Additionally, the 1943 Amendments changed the amount
awarded to relators. In cases where the government chose to
pursue the lawsuit, the court was given the authority to award
the relator a reasonable and fair amount of the proceeds collected, not to exceed one-tenth of the total proceeds awarded or
recovered from the suit or settlement. 27 In cases where the government chose not to pursue the lawsuit, however, the award
could range up to one-fourth of the total proceeds collected
from the suit or settlement.28
Opponents of the 1943 Amendments argued that the changes
virtually gutted the qui tam provisions of the Act.29 Under the
amended Act, relators could file a lawsuit only where the government did not have any previous knowledge of the alleged
fraud. Thus, a private individual who provided information of
fraudulent activity to the government before filing suit was
barred from subsequently bringing a FCA lawsuit as a relator
because the government had knowledge of the fraud. Also,
since the 1943 Amendments significantly decreased the relator's
potential bounty, they weakened the lure of a large financial incentive to file suit. These criticisms were recognized and remedied by Congress when the FCA was again amended in 1986.
3.

The 1986 Amendments

Some courts believed the opinion of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean3 °
was the impetus prompting Congress to amend the Act in
1986.31 In Dean, the State of Wisconsin, acting as a qui tam relator, brought an action against a psychiatrist for making fraudulent claims to receive Medicaid reimbursements for her
26. Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608, § 1 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 232 (1976)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. In criticizing the proposed 1943 Amendments, Representative Miller stated:
"In their zeal to remedy this [parasitic] condition they have overlooked, in my judgment, and perhaps unwittingly placed limitations upon the prosecution of true informer actions which defeat the very purpose and in practical effect nullify true
informer suits... [t]his bill deters the honest informer." 89 CONG. REC. 10847 (1943)
(statement of Rep. Miller).
30. United States ex rel. State of Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984).
31. See, e.g., Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1419 (9th Cir. 1993).
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services. 32 Because the federal government possessed information about the fraudulent acts before the suit was brought, the
Seventh Circuit considered whether the district court had
proper jurisdiction.33 In reversing the district court, the Seventh
Circuit explained that the unambiguous language of the Act
prohibited jurisdiction where a complaint was "based upon evidence or information in the possession of the United States, or
any agency, officer or employee thereof, at the time" such complaint was filed. 34 Therefore, despite the fact the State of Wisconsin was required to inform the federal government of the
alleged fraudulent acts it discovered, because the United States
knew about the alleged fraudulent acts when the suit was filed,
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.35 The Dean
opinion illustrated that the jurisdictional bar failed to reward
those individuals who were responsible for informing the government of fraudulent acts. This defect was one of many addressed in the 1986 Amendments.
The 1986 Amendments, which created the modern FCA, drastically changed the Act-especially the qui tam provisions of the
Act. The major changes included (1) clarifying the intent standard, which resulted in a reversal of restrictive court interpretations; (2) increasing the amount of damages and civil penalties
that could be assessed; (3) increasing the relator's reward; (4)
changing the scope of the jurisdictional bar; (5) modifying the
36
statute of limitations; and (6) amending the filing procedures.
One of the questions addressed in litigation prior to the 1986
Amendments was the level of intent required under the Act.
Before the 1986 Amendments, the majority of courts required
proof that the defendant had specific intent to defraud the government. 37 The 1986 Amendments defined "knowledge" of fal32. Dean, 729 F.2d at 1102.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1103-04 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 232(C)).
35. Id. at 1106-07.
36. The 1986 Amendments also created a provision that allows a company to voluntarily disclose its own misconduct in order to reduce its exposure to liability under
the Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994), a provision to address "reverse false claims" (i.e.
when a person makes a false statement to reduce his/her liability to pay money to the
government), id. § 3729(a)(7), a provision establishing the standard of proof by a
"preponderance of the evidence," 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c) (1994), and a provision that
protects individuals from retaliation by an employer for involvement in an FCA case,
31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1994).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1509 (11th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118
(9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1962); and United
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sity in a way that "[a]ttempts to reach what has become known
as the 'ostrich' type situation where an individual has 'buried his
head in the sand' and failed to make simple inquiries which
would alert him that false claims are being submitted. ' 38 Congress clarified that specific intent was not required under the
Act, and that "knowingly" could be shown by proving actual
knowledge, deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the
truth or falsity of the information.39
The 1986 Amendments strengthened the FCA by increasing
the civil penalties from $2,000 per violation to between $5,000
and $10,000 per violation. 40 Additionally, Congress increased
the damages from double the damages sustained by the government as a result of the individual's unlawful act, to triple those
damages.4 1
One of the main goals of the 1986 Amendments was to encourage private individuals to come forward with information
by increasing the potential reward amount.42 After the 1986
Amendments, in cases where the government chooses to intervene, the relator is entitled to at least 15% of the proceeds recovered, but could receive as much 25%. 4 3 In cases where the
government does not intervene, the relator is entitled to anywhere between 25% to 30% of the proceeds. 44 Additionally, the
successful relator
is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and
45
other costs.
Although the jurisdictional bar added in the 1943 Amendments solved the problem of parasitic lawsuits, it also prohibited
lawsuits from being brought by individuals who were the original source of the information provided to the government.
States ex rel. Brensilber v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 131 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1942).
But see United States v. Hughes, 585 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1973); Fleming v. United States, 336
F.2d 475 (10th Cir. 1964). Each of these courts found that no specific intent was
required.
38. S.REP. No. 99-345, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5286.
39. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (1994).
40. Id. § 3729(a).
41. Id. However, double damages may still be awarded in cases where defendants
meet self-reporting requirements. Id.
42. "The proposed legislation seeks... to encourage any individual knowing of
Government fraud to bring that information forward.... S.1562 increases incentives,
financial and otherwise, for private individuals to bring suits on behalf of the Government." S. REP. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266-67.
43. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (1994).
44. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
45. Id.
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Thus, the 1986 Amendments also sought to correct the problem
of prohibiting individuals from acting as relators in cases where
the relator initially brought the information to the government's
attention. 46 Therefore, a "public disclosure" provision was added to the Act, which provided that no court could have jurisdiction over a qui tam action if the information which served as
the basis for the claim was publicly disclosed, unless the relator
could show that s/he was the original source of such
information.47
Another change made to the Act related to the statute of limitations period. The permissible period for filing a false claim
action was amended from six years after the violation occurred
to either six years after the violation occurred or three years
after the government should have learned of the facts underlying the claim, whichever is longer, but in no event longer than
ten years from the date of the unlawful violation.48 This change
in the statute of limitations would permit the government to
bring suit beyond the six-year tolling period if it did not have a
concrete suspicion that the fraudulent activity in issue had
occurred.
Lastly, a minor change was made in the filing procedures for
qui tam actions. In addition to the requirements under the 1943
Act, which required a qui tam plaintiff to serve a copy of the
complaint and all evidence in his or her possession on the
United States, the 1986 Amendments required the plaintiff to
file his or her complaint in camera, where it would remain under
seal for at least 60 days. 49 Within this 60-day period the government may elect to intervene and proceed with the cause of action or may notify the court that it declines to intervene.5 0
B.

Components of the Current Act

1. The Elements
The FCA provision used most often to prosecute individuals
and entities in the health care industry prohibits any person
from knowingly presenting or causing to be presented a false or
46. 132 CONG. REC. 20535 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Grassley).
47. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A); see also infra Part III.A-B for a detailed explanation of court interpretations of the "public disclosure bar."
48. Id. § 3731(b).
49. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
50. Id. § 3730(b)(4)(A)-(B). However, upon a showing of good cause, the government may petition the court for extensions of time in addition to the sixty-day period.

Id. § 3730(b)(3).
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fraudulent claim, record or statement for payment or approval
to the United States Government.51 The Act defines "claim" as
a request or demand for money or property, made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient, if the government provides or
reimburses any part of the money or property that is requested
or demanded. 52 Although specific intent to defraud need not be
proven, the government bears the burden of showing that the
individual in question "knowingly" committed the prohibited
statutory conduct. 3 Courts addressing the scienter requirement
have determined that the government must prove more than
gross negligence in order to meet the least burdensome standard
of "reckless disregard.

2.

'54

Penalties and Damages

As mentioned above, the 1986 Amendments provided that individuals found liable under the FCA are subject to civil penalties of between $5,000 and $10,000 per claim. On August 30,
1999, the Office of the Attorney General issued a final rule that
increased the civil monetary penalty amount by 10%.-56 Consequently, individuals can now be assessed civil penalties of between $5,500 and $11,000 per claim. 7 Additionally, the

defendant still can be assessed three times the amount of damages the government sustains as a result of the fraudulent action.58 However, in cases where the individual committing the
violation cooperates with the government investigation, the
court may choose a more lenient punishment of two times the
amount of damages the government incurs as a result of the
fraudulent action. 59

51. Id. § 3729(a)(1).
52. Id. § 3729(c).
53. Id. § 3729(b).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating
that reckless disregard is "a linear extension of gross negligence or 'gross negligenceplus"'); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(explaining that one meaning of reckless disregard is "simply a linear extension of
gross negligence, a palpable failure to meet the appropriate standard of care.").
55. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
56. Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment, 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9) (2000).
Pursuant to section 5 of the Federal Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-410, Congress has the authority to adjust civil monetary
penalties in accordance with inflation.
57. 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9).
58. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
59. Id.
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3. Qui Tam Provisions
The qui tam or whistleblower provisions of the FCA empower
private citizens who are the original source of information regarding fraudulent wrongdoings to bring an action, on behalf of
the government, against the individual or entity committing the
fraud. 60 The Act defines an "original source" as "[a]n individual
who has direct and independent knowledge of the information
on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided
the information to the Government before filing an action under
this section which is based on the information."6 1 Once the relator properly serves the government with the complaint containing material evidence of the alleged fraudulent activity, the
government has sixty days to decide if it wants to proceed with
the action. 62 If the government decides to proceed with the action, the relator can continue as a party, but the government has
the primary responsibility for prosecution.63 If the government
declines to intervene, the relator can continue the action alone;
however, upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit
the government to enter the suit at a later date. 64
The monetary reward to the relator differs depending on
whether the government chooses to intervene or not. As mentioned above, in cases where the government intervenes in the
action, the relator can recover anywhere between 15% and 25%
of the award or settlement amount. 65 However, if the government does not intervene in the action, the relator can recover
between 25% and 30% of the proceeds. 66 In addition to a percentage of the proceeds, the court has discretion to award the
relator reasonable expenses incurred, plus reasonable attorneys'
fees.67
60.
61.

Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).

62.. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
63. Id. § 3730(c)(1). As a party to the action, the relator is subject to certain limitations. Id. § 3730(c)(2). For example, notwithstanding the objections of the relator,
the government may dismiss the action if it provides notice to the relator and may
settle the action if the court determines the settlement to be fair, adequate and reasonable. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(A)-(B). Also, the court may restrict the relator's participation in the litigation if the government or the defendant shows that the relator's
unrestricted participation would be burdensome or would be for purposes of harass-

ment. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(C)-(D).
64. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
65. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
66.

Id. § 3730(d)(2).

67.

Id. § 3730(d)(1).
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In some cases the relator may receive a reduced amount of
the proceeds recovered, or no reward at all. For example, if the
court finds that the relator played an insignificant role in advancing the case to litigation (e.g., the information provided to
the government was insignificant, or the disclosure of specific
information relating to the fraud was based primarily on other
sources), the court can award an amount it deems appropriate
so long as it does not exceed 10% of the proceeds recovered in
the case.68 Similarly, if the court finds that the relator planned
or participated in the alleged fraudulent activity, it has discretion to reduce the relator's share of the proceeds to the extent it
considers appropriate. 69 Finally, if the relator is convicted of
criminal conduct for his or her role in the alleged fraud, s/he will
be dismissed from the action and will not receive any share of
the proceeds recovered in the action.7 °
As a result of the 1986 Amendments, a qui tam relator is also
protected from retaliation by his or her employer. Specifically,
"[a]ny employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended,
threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated
against in the terms and conditions of employment by his or her
employer" because of his or her role in an FCA action or investigation "shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make [him or
her] whole."'7 In addition to litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees, "[s]uch relief shall include reinstatement with the
same seniority status such employee would have had but for the
discrimination, two times the amount of back pay, interest on
the back pay, and compensation for any72 special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination.
II.

GOVERNMENT USE OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT TO
COMBAT FRAUD AND ABUSE

A.

Department of Justice Guidance

The Attorney General is responsible for investigating and
prosecuting violators under the FCA.73 As a division of the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS"), the Office
of Inspector General ("OIG") works with the DOJ on national
68. Id.
69. Id. § 3730(d)(3).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 3730(h).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 3730(a).
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projects to combat Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse. 4
In using the FCA to pursue national initiatives, 75 the government has been criticized for being unfair and overzealous. For
example, on August 12, 1999, the American Hospital Association ("AHA") sent a letter to the DOJ demanding that prosecutors improve the way they use the FCA against hospitals. 6
Citing the August 8, 1999, GAO Report to Congress on Medicare Fraud and Abuse, the letter expressed concern about
"overreaching and injustice in the government's use of the False
Claims Act against hospitals. ' 77 In order to address allegations
of heavy-handed tactics regarding the application of the FCA,
Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder ("the Deputy") issued
a memorandum on June 3, 1998 ("DOJ Memorandum"), to all
United States Attorneys, First Assistant United States Attorneys, Civil Health Care Fraud Coordinators in the Offices of the
United States Attorneys, and Trial Attorneys in the Civil Division Commercial Litigation Section ("the Prosecutors").78 The
DOJ Memorandum was issued "[t]o emphasize the importance
of pursuing civil False Claims Act cases against health care providers in a fair and even-handed manner, and to implement new

74. The OIG gives recommendations to the DOJ for civil and criminal action.
Also, as part of its responsibilities, the OIG issues fraud alerts on certain areas vulnerable to fraud and abuse and advisory opinions regarding certain proposed transactions. The OIG also publishes model compliance plans and has the power to impose
civil monetary penalties and to recommend exclusions from Medicare when individuals violate the anti-kickback statute.
75. The DOJ defines "national initiatives" as nationwide investigations that "deal
with a common wrongful action accomplished in a like manner by multiple, similarly
situated health care providers." ERIC H. HOLDER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., GUIDANCE
ON THE USE OF THE FALSE CLAIMS Acr IN CIVIL HEALTH CARE MATTERS (June 3,
1998) [hereinafter "DOJ GUIDANCE"]. Examples of national initiatives are Physicians at Teaching Hospitals ("PATH") (focusing on inappropriate billing practices by
teaching hospitals for services actually performed by residents); Laboratory Unbundling ("Operation Bad Bundle") (focusing on inappropriate billing for laboratory
services in separate components which should have been billed as one service); 72Hour Window Rule (focusing on inappropriate billing for outpatient services received
within 72 hours of a hospital admission and which were already paid by Medicare's
inpatient reimbursement); Prospective Payment System ("PPS") Transfer (focusing
on inappropriate billing practices that indicated a patient discharge when in fact the
patient was transferred to another hospital); and DRG Pneumonia Upcoding (focusing on inappropriate upcoding of simple pneumonia to complicated pneumonia in
order to obtain a higher Medicare reimbursement). Id.
76. Fraudand Abuse: AHA Blasts Justice Departmentfor Inconsistent Use of False
Claims Act, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA), at d3 (Aug. 26, 1999).
77. Id.; see infra Part II.C for discussion of the GAO Report.
78. See DOJ GUIDANCE, supra note 75.
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procedures with respect to'79the development and implementation of national initiatives.
The bulk of the DOJ Memorandum gives specific guidance on
how to deal with national initiatives pursued by the DOJ (the
"Guidance"). Generally, the Deputy instructed that Prosecutors should focus on overarching legal and factual issues while
avoiding a rigid approach that fails to consider the individual
facts and circumstances of each case.8 ° In order to accomplish
these goals, when investigating national initiatives, Prosecutors
should always ascertain whether there is a sufficient legal and
factual predicate to allege a violation under the FCA.81 In other
words, Prosecutors should ask whether the alleged violator (1)
submitted a false claim and (2) submitted the claim with knowledge of its falsity.82 When determining whether a false claim
exists, the Deputy instructed that Prosecutors should carefully
examine relevant statutory and regulatory provisions along with
the interpretive guidance, take steps to verify the validity and
accuracy of any data relied upon, and conduct pertinent investigations. 83 Next, when determining whether the alleged wrongdoer "knowingly" submitted false claims, Prosecutors should
consider the following factors: whether the alleged wrongdoer
was on notice of the rule or policy upon which the potential violation would be based, the clarity of the rule or policy, the pervasiveness of the false claims, any existing compliance plans in
place, any previous remedial efforts to correct improper conduct, whether the alleged wrongdoer made any attempt to contact the program agency regarding clarification of a billing rule
at issue, and whether the alleged wrongdoer was part of a prior
audit or billing admonition.84
In addition to verifying the sufficiency of legal and factual
predicates, the Deputy mandated that the Attorney General's
Advisory Committee and the Civil Division create working
groups to oversee the development and implementation of national initiatives. 85 Also, Prosecutors are required to use "contact letters" to allow potential violators an adequate opportunity
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
serves
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Although this list is not exhaustive and will not apply to every case, it
as a general reminder for prosecutors to think about in a given situation.
Id.
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to discuss the allegations at issue before a demand for settlement is made.8 6 Additional mandates for Prosecutors include:
considering alternative suitable remedies as well as the ability of
the alleged wrongdoer to pay a specific settlement amount; considering the impact of the action on the community when dealing with rural and community hospitals; avoiding the
appearance of coercion in cases where the alleged violator is not
represented by counsel; minimizing burdens imposed on providers during investigations; and promoting cooperation with audit
or investigation of the alleged wrongdoing.87
B.

Office of Inspector General Guidance

On the same day the DOJ Memorandum was issued, Inspector General June Gibbs Brown issued a memorandum to the
Inspector General for Investigations, the Deputy Inspector
General for Audit Services, and the Assistant Inspector General
for Legal Affairs regarding "best practice guidelines" for national project initiatives ("OIG Memorandum"). 88 The OIG
Memorandum delineates six guidelines for OIG agents to follow
when participating in national
projects to eliminate particular
89
fraud and abuse practices.
First, the OIG will "set an appropriate minimum monetary
threshold and/or percentage error rate" for each national project as a guideline to determine which health care providers may
be engaging in fraudulent billing practices. 90 Second, in order to
promote equitable treatment among providers and to minimize
variations among judicial districts, the OIG intends to consistently apply investigative protocols, settlement agreement terms,
and corporate integrity provisions. 91 Third, the OIG will determine the availability of its own resources for a particular initiative before referring such initiative to the DOJ or any other law
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General National Project Protocols, Released June 3, 2 Health Care Fraud Rep. (BNA) 431, 464

(June 6, 1998) [hereinafter "OIG Protocols"].
89.

Id.

90. Id. Although the threshold will vary depending on the national project, it will
be determined by looking at various factors such as "Medicare and/or Medicaid revenues, total health care revenues, prior audits and notice to the provider community,
provider size, number of erroneous claims, and overpayment liability." Id.
91.

Id.
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enforcement partner. 92 Fourth, the OIG will work with all law
enforcement agencies and with the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") in order to notify representatives of the
targeted health care industry or provider community, where appropriate, prior to the formal initiation of the national project. 93
Fifth, the OIG will evaluate the legal basis and sufficiency supporting a national project before referring any data or information regarding the development of the project. 94 Finally, the
OIG will designate certain individuals from each OIG component involved in a national project as contacts, in order to facilitate lines of communication between the involved parties in
each particular project.95
C. Government Accounting Office Reports
The Government Accounting Office ("GAO") is an independent, nonpartisan government agency that works for Congress
to oversee and improve government operations. After evaluating federal government expenditures and federal program operations, the GAO frequently issues reports to Congress and
recommends actions on how to make the government more effective and responsive. Pursuant to the Omnibus Consolidated
and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 199996 and
the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, 9 7 the GAO is required to monitor the DOJ's compliance with the June 3, 1998
Guidance. The GAO has issued four reports regarding this matter-in February 1999, August 1999, March 2000, and, most recently, in March 2001.
In the February 1999 report ("February 1999 Report"), the
GAO surveyed all ninety-three U.S. Attorneys in order to examine early implementation of the Guidance, and met with
members of the AHA and a state hospital group to discuss their
concerns regarding the Guidance.98 Specifically, the GAO
92. Id. This self-assessment is for the purpose of giving notice to the OIG's law
enforcement partners regarding the resources it is able to commit to a particular initiative. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 464.
95. Id.
96. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681.
97. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1395b-6).
98. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON MEDICARE
FRAUD AND ABUSE, Early Status of DOJ's Compliance With False Claims Act Guidance, at 2 (Feb. 1, 1999) [hereinafter "GAO FEBRUARY 1999 REPORT"].
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looked at whether the DOJ had implemented the required protocols in national health care initiatives. 99 The February 1999
Report indicated that the DOJ had incorporated the Guidance
into its training programs on health care fraud issues and had an
evaluation program, which was conducted every few years, to
review DOJ operations. 1°° In general, the GAO was unable to
comprehensively evaluate the use of the Guidance in all of the
national initiatives since many offices were still preparing documentation to guide the U.S. Attorneys. 10 1 Of the five major national health care investigations (i.e., Physicians at Teaching
Hospitals, Laboratory Unbundling, 72-Hour Window Rule, PPS
Transfer, and DRG Pneumonia Upcoding), only the Laboratory
Unbundling and the PPS Transfer working groups had finalized
guidance for offices participating in these investigations.1 0 2 Interestingly, the February 1999 Report noted that since the Guidance was issued, nearly seven times as many national initiative
cases were closed as were opened.1 0 3 Approximately 53% of
these cases were from the Laboratory Unbundling project, 46%
were from the 72-Hour Window Rule project, and less than 1%
were from the DRG Pneumonia Upcoding project. 0 4 However,
whereas 99% of the 72-Hour Window Rule cases were settled
(1% were closed without adverse action), 88% of the Laboratory Unbundling cases were closed without adverse action (12%
were settled). 10 5 The high percentage of Laboratory Unbundling cases that closed without adverse action raised a suspicion as to the merit of the DOJ allegations in those cases.
The GAO report issued on August 6, 1999 ("August 1999 Report") was more critical of the DOJ's efforts to follow the Guidance in national initiatives.10 6 In evaluating the
implementation and use of the Guidance, the GAO focused on
the status of the DOJ workgroups in implementing initiativespecific guidance, the implementation of the Guidance at selected U.S. Attorney offices, and the DOJ's efforts to monitor
99. Id.
100. Id. at 5.
101. Id. at 3.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id. at 7.
104. Id. at 8.
105. Id.
106. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON MEDICARE
FRAUD AND ABUSE, DOJ's Implementation of False Claims Act Guidance in National Initiatives Varies (Aug. 6, 1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/ openrecs99/
abstracts/he99170.htm [hereinafter "GAO AUGUST 1999 REPORT"].
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compliance with the Guidance. °7 The GAO again surveyed
state hospital associations' concerns regarding the DOJ's use of
the FCA. 10 8 While the GAO indicated in the August 1999 Report that the DOJ had made further progress in implementing
the Guidance since its February 1999 Report, and that all the
work groups had completed the implementation of initiativespecific guidance consistent with the requirements of the Guidance, the GAO was skeptical about the DOJ's effort to monitor compliance with the Guidance. 109 In attacking the DOJ's
efforts, the GAO stated that the "DOJ's process for assessing
the U.S. Attorneys' Offices' compliance may be superficial" and
that the "assessments appear to involve little more than reviewers asking supervisors what they have done to ensure compliance with the [G]uidance." 110 The August 1999 Report also
indicated that the actions of the selected sample of U.S. Attorney Offices were in varying degrees inconsistent with the Guidance, and there were questions about whether some of the
offices were promptly incorporating the Guidance in their initiatives."' On a positive note, the August 1999 Report indicated
that the issuance of the Guidance had lessened the concerns of
12
the state hospital associations regarding national initiatives.
In order to improve its oversight of appropriate use of the Guidance, the GAO recommended that the DOJ develop specific
guidelines for reviewers on how to evaluate compliance, and require each reviewer to independently determine if his/her office
3
is indeed complying with the Guidance."
On March 31, 2000, the GAO issued a third report on the
DOJ's progress between December 1999 and March 2000
("March 2000 Report")." 4 Specifically, the March 2000 Report
assessed what progress the DOJ had made in responding to
prior recommendations by the GAO, and what the DOJ had
done to resolve the Laboratory Unbundling controversy. 115 In
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
FRAUD

dance

Id. at 1.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 17.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON MEDICARE
AND ABUSE, DOJ Has Made Progress in Implementing False Claims Act Gui(Mar. 31, 2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/ openrecs99/abstracts/

he99170.htm [hereinafter "GAO
115.

MARCH

2000

REPORT"]

Id.at 2.
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particular, the GAO targeted the U.S. Attorney offices that had
been slow to implement the Guidance.1 16 On the whole, the
March 2000 Report concluded that the DOJ has made progress
in complying with its own Guidance, creating a more effective
evaluation process, and improving efforts in the Laboratory Unbundling initiative." 7 On the topic of compliance and evaluation of compliance, the March 2000 Report indicated that the
DOJ: (1) has developed a pre-evaluation process to prepare offices for on-site reviews; (2) has added an additional, more detailed, set of interview questions to evaluate compliance
protocols; (3) now requires annual independent internal reviews
to certify compliance with the Guidance; and (4) has expanded
the role of the working groups with an emphasis on monitoring
compliance. 8 As for the Laboratory Unbundling initiative, the
March 2000 Report indicates that the offices that were in transition when the compliance guidelines were issued had made progress in correcting previous deficiencies, and were now in
compliance with the guidelines.11 9 Although the March 2000
Report indicated some improvement in the Laboratory Unbundling initiative, it did not indicate effective use of the FCA in
other fraud and abuse national initiatives.
Recently, the GAO issued a fourth report to evaluate the
DOJ's progress with ensuring compliance with the Guidance
("March 2001 Report"). 20 Specifically, the March 2001 Report
sought to determine whether (1) the DOJ had improved its
oversight of U.S. Attorneys' Offices to ensure compliance with
the Guidance, and (2) the U.S. Attorneys' Offices were conducting the Prospective Payment System Transfer and Pneumonia Upcoding initiatives ("Initiatives") in accordance with the
Guidance. 2 ' In order to evaluate the DOJ's oversight of U.S.
Attorneys' Offices, the GAO discussed ongoing compliance efforts with DOJ officials and reviewed materials related to periodic evaluations. 22 To determine whether the Initiatives were
being conducted in a manner consistent with the Guidance, the
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6-9.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES ON MEDICARE FRAUD AND ABUSE, DOJ Has Improved Oversight of False
Claims Act Guidance (March 30, 2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/
fetchrpt?rptno=GAO-01-506 [hereinafter "GAO MARCH 2001 REPORT"].
121. Id. at 2.
122. Id.
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GAO interviewed members of the working groups that coordinated each Initiative and reviewed files for both Initiatives in
four of the ninety-four U.S. Attorneys' Offices.'23 Generally,
the March 2001 Report concluded that the DOJ has taken steps
to improve its oversight of compliance with the Guidance and
has conducted the Initiatives in a manner consistent with the
Guidance. 124 However, the March 2001 Report indicated that
the hospital association representatives who were interviewed in
the districts of the four U.S. Attorneys' offices that were visited
continued to express concerns about the appropriateness of the
DOJ's use of the FCA in civil health care matters.125
D.

The Government's Role in Improving the FCA

When enacting the original Informer's Act, President Lincoln
descriptively stated: "Worse than traitors in arms are the men
who pretend loyalty to the flag, feast and fatten on the misfortune of the Nation while patriotic blood is crimsoning the plains
of the South and their countrymen are mouldering [sic] in the
dust. 1 26 Although the application of the FCA in the health care
industry does not equate with such an illustrative description,
the modern day crooked provider is somewhat analogous to the
historical war thief. These are the individuals we seek to punish,
and who are worthy of such punishment.
However, when the FCA is used to force unwitting providers
into settlements, it becomes a powerful weapon against which
many defendants are virtually powerless to rebut allegations of
wrongdoing. While the government is rightfully praised for pursuing deliberate violators, it is equally worthy of condemnation
when the morally innocent become wrongfully entrapped. Although the March 2000 Report and the March 2001 Report indicate that the DOJ has made progress with regard to applying its
own Guidance, the success has been confirmed only in a small
percentage of U.S. Attorneys' Offices. In the March 2001 Report, the GAO visited only 4% of the total U.S. Attorneys' Offices in order to review materials supporting compliance with
the Guidance in conducting the Initiatives. 27 Needless to say,
the DOJ's recent efforts are a step in the right direction and
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
89 CONG. REC. 10847 (1943) (quoting President Lincoln).
See GAO MARCH 2001 REPORT, supra note 120, at 2.
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should not be ignored. It is certainly significant that the DOJ is
attempting to comply with its Guidance. However, only time
will tell if, indeed, the efforts to comply with the Guidance in
conducting other national initiatives are manifested in subsequent GAO reports and whether compliance with the Guidance
can be confirmed in all of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices.
In the meantime, the government should avoid using the FCA
as "a vehicle for regulatory compliance. ' 128 The DOJ can effectuate internal improvement by surveying not only the overall
implementation of the Guidance in each office, but also the relative understanding of the Guidance by each Assistant United
States Attorney. As far as improving relations with potential
violators, alleged wrongdoers should be allowed to explain how
and why particular items or procedures were coded a certain
way when complex billing regulations are involved. Or, when
the DOJ relies on data as an indication of unlawful billing practices, alleged wrongdoers should be given the opportunity to explain why the data may not be accurate. 129 By encouraging a
more cooperative relationship, the DOJ is less likely to face accusations of abusive and coercive enforcement tactics. However, additional government improvement of its enforcement
tactics is only a starting point for remedying the problems with
the FCA. In order to achieve an effective and equitable FCA,
judicial and legislative efforts must align with executive efforts.
The next section discusses the role of the judiciary in effectuating positive changes in the Act.
III.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

JURISDICTIONAL BAR

The public disclosure jurisdictional bar is significant because it
limits the relator's ability to bring a lawsuit. Eliminating parasitic lawsuits has been a goal of the Act since the 1943 Amendments, and the public disclosure bar is the vehicle used to
prohibit such lawsuits. However, it continues to be one of the
most widely litigated components of the Act. The 1986 Amend128. Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 2 F. Supp.2d 1034, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
129. In a July 1998 report, the GAO indicated that hospitals raised legitimate concerns about how the DOJ used data from different sources as the sole basis for liability under the FCA. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS,
Medicare:Application of False Claims Act to Hospital Billing Practices,at 18 (July 10,

1998). The report also suggested that providers be given the opportunity to cast
doubt on the accuracy of such data before legal action is threatened or undertaken.
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ments broadened the scope of the jurisdictional bar in order to
encourage private individuals to assist the government in attacking fraud. 130 However, due to the divergent interpretations of
the appellate courts, the correct application of the public disclosure provision remains largely a mystery.
A.

What is a Public Disclosure?

The FCA prohibits jurisdiction over a qui tam action if the
action is based upon [a] public disclosure of allegations or
transactions in a criminal, civil or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or
the person bringing
the action is an original source of the
31
information.1

In order to assert the jurisdictional bar as a defense, the defendant must show that (1) there has been a public disclosure of
allegations or transactions; (2) in a criminal, civil or administrative hearing, or in a congressional, administrative or GAO report, hearing, audit or investigation, or from the news media; (3)
the relator's suit is based on this public disclosure; and (4) the
132
relator is not the originalsource of the information.
1.

Court Interpretations of a "Public" Disclosure of
"Allegations or Transactions"

The requirement of a "public" disclosure has been interpreted
differently by the courts. In defining "public disclosure" the
courts have considered what the words mean, when the public
disclosure occurs and to what extent the allegations or transactions must be disclosed. The word "public" is generally defined
as "pertaining to a state, nation, or whole community; proceeding from, relating to, or affecting the whole body of people or an
entire community. Open to all; notorious. Common to all or
130. See 145 CONG. REC. E1546-01, E1546 (daily ed. July 14, 1999) (statement of
Rep. Berman).
131. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(1994). Additionally, under this provision no court
shall have jurisdiction over actions brought by current or former members of the
armed forces, id. § 3730(e)(1); actions against members of Congress or the judiciary,
or a senior executive branch official if the government has prior knowledge of the
allegations that serve as the basis for the allegation, id. § 3730(e)(2)(A); and actions
based on another civil suit or administrative civil monetary proceeding where the government is already a party, id. § 3730(e)(3).
132. Cf United States ex rel. Lindenthal v. General Dynamics Corp., 61 F.3d
1402, 1409 (9th Cir. 1995).
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many; general; open to common use. '133 "Disclosure" is defined
as the "Act of disclosing. Revelation; the impartation of that
which is secret or not fully understood. ' 134 The combination of
these definitions leaves room for interpretation. For example,
are allegations and transactions "public" if they are "open to
all" but only one person has actually seen them? Similarly, are
allegations and transactions "revealed" if they are available for

perusal by the public but no one has actually seen them?
The courts have employed different rationales in analyzing
whether a public disclosure has occurred. For example, the First
Circuit has determined that something becomes public when the
information is available to "strangers to the fraud transaction" if
they chose to look for it. 135 Similarly, the Second Circuit has
held that information becomes public when it is placed in the
"public domain. "136
Some courts disagree about whether the information must actually be disclosed to constitute a public disclosure, or whether

the mere potential to discover the information is sufficient. The
Third Circuit held that absent a protective court order, discovery material disclosed to another party is potentially available to

the public and therefore constitutes a public disclosure.1 37 In
contrast, the District of Columbia Circuit held that theoretical
disclosure or potential accessibility to information is not sufficient to invoke the jurisdictional bar.138 Instead, the disclosed

133. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY ABRIDGED 854 (6th ed. 1991).
134. Id. at 320.
135. United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1155-56 (3d Cir. 1990); see also, e.g., United States ex rel. Fine
v. MK-Ferguson Co., 99 F.3d 1538, 1545 (10th Cir. 1996); United States ex rel. Doe v.
John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 322-23 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that public disclosure
occurred because information was divulged to employees of defendant-corporation
who were "strangers to the fraud").
136. United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 18 (2d
Cir. 1990); accord United States ex reL Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d
645, 652-55 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United
Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1158 (2d Cir. 1993) (determining that discovery information containing the allegations by relator was publicly disclosed when the information
was filed with the court because "[i]t was available to anyone who wished to consult
the court file.").
137. Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1158.
138. Springfield, 14 F.3d at 652; accord United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166
F.3d 853, 860 (7th Cir. 1999); Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514,
1519 (10th Cir. 1996); United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d
1512, 1520 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939 (1997); MK-Ferguson, 99 F.3d at 1544.
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information must be "in the public eye. '"139 One court determined that disclosure by the state government to the federal
government is a public disclosure because it is actually available
to the public. 14 0 Also, most courts have held that information
obtained via the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") is publicly disclosed.'41
The extent to which the information must be made public is
another issue the courts have encountered. The Second Circuit
decided that the information does not need to be widespread in
order to be publicly disclosed. 42 The Tenth Circuit determined
that a public disclosure occurs if "the allegations [are disclosed]
to any member of the public not previously informed
thereof.' 43 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit had stated that the
disclosure must either be to the public at large, or to a public
official "whose duties extend to the claim in question in some
significant way.' 1 44 Some courts disagree about whether dissemof the
ination of public allegations or transactions to employees
145
alleged wrongdoer constitutes public disclosure.
Another question the courts have addressed is what kind of
information qualifies as "allegations and transactions" for purposes of section 3730(e)(4)(A). The Ninth Circuit explained
that information alone, without the allegation of fraudulent ac139. Springfield, 14 F.3d at 653; accord United States ex rel. Branhan v. Mercy
Health System, No. 98-3127, 1999 WL 618018 (6th Cir. Aug. 5, 1999); Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d at 860; cf MK-Ferguson, 99 F.3d at 1545.
140. MK-Ferguson, 99 F.3d at 1545.
141. United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d
376, 383 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that United States Department of Housing and Urban Development's response to an FOIA request is a public disclosure); Schumer, 63
F.3d at 1520 (explaining that "[i]n the FOIA context, information cannot be deemed
disclosed until a member of the public requests the information and receives it from
the government."); United States v. A.D. Roe Co., Inc., 186 F.3d 717, 723-24 (6th Cir.
1999) (same). But see United States v. Pentagen Techs. Int'l Ltd. v. CACI Int'l Inc.,
No. CIV.2925, 1995 WL 693236, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 1995) (unpublished) (holding that FOIA information is not publicly disclosed).
142. United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 323 (2d Cir. 1992).
143. United States ex rel.Fine v. Advanced Sciences, Inc., 99 F.3d 1000, 1006 (10th
Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); accord Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1520-21.
144. Bank of Farmington,166 F.3d at 861.
145. Compare Doe, 960 F.2d at 319-20 (holding that public disclosure occurred
when federal government informed employees on site that it was investigating fraudulent overcharging under defense contracts), with Schumer, 63 F.3d at 1519 (holding
that disclosure to employees does not constitute public disclosure),. and Hagood v.
Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
public disclosure did not occur where a government employee disclosed to himself, as
a member of the public, information upon which his suit was based).
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tivity, is not enough to trigger the jurisdictional bar.'46 However, the court went on to explain that the distinction between
"allegations" and "information" rarely matters because "where
the public knows of information proving an allegation, it necessarily knows of the allegation itself.' 1 47 The Sixth Circuit has
determined that the allegations or transactions should not consist of merely innocuous information, but rather must create "an
inference of impropriety.' 1 48 More specifically, the Third Circuit requires disclosures to reveal either "the allegations or the
elements of the underlying fraudulent transaction. "149
In Springfield Terminal Railway Co. v. Quinn5 ° , the District
of Columbia Circuit outlined a test for determining when information constitutes allegations or transactions sufficient enough
to alert the government of potential fraudulent activities: where
X + Y = Z, Z represents the allegation of the fraud and X and Y
represent the essential elements. 151 Thus, in order for a public
disclosure of allegations or transactions to occur, the disclosure
of X and Y must yield an inference of Z (i.e. that fraud has been
committed). 52 In Springfield, the court determined that the information disclosed in an earlier discovery proceeding did not
rise to the level of allegations or transactions because there was
no indication of fraud revealed in the disclosed information. 53
Similarly, in an unpublished opinion by the Sixth Circuit, the
court determined that while HCFA records containing data of
Medicare payments were definitely considered information,
"they alone do not illustrate a fraud perpetrated by Defendants,
146. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir. 1992); cf. Cooper v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 566 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that
general allegations of widespread fraud in a GAO report that do not name defendant
is insufficient to trigger jurisdictional bar).
147. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418.
148. United States ex rel. Jones v. Horizon Healthcare Corp., 160 F.3d 326, 331-32
(6th Cir. 1998).
149. United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, 123 F.3d 734, 740 (3d
Cir. 1997); accord United States ex rel. Mistick v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186
F.3d 376, 388 (3d Cir. 1998); United States ex rel. Findley, 105 F.3d 675, 686-87 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); see also United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14
F.3d 645, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (requiring that the material elements of the alleged
fraudulent activity must be disclosed); accord A-1 Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. California,
202 F.3d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000).
150. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 654
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
151. Id. at 654-56.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 655-56.
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and do not constitute 'allegations and transactions'.' ' 154 Thus,
there had been no public disclosure of allegations or
transactions. 55
Once the allegations and transactions are sufficient to alert
the government of potential fraud, the courts generally reject
the argument that special expertise or unique knowledge (i.e.,
special knowledge which allows an individual to put together information as fraud) defeats the jurisdictional bar. For example,
in Springfield, the District of Columbia Circuit held that "expertise in the field of engineering would not in itself give a qui tam
plaintiff the basis for suit when all the material elements of
fraud are publicly available, though not readily comprehensible
to nonexperts.' 1 56 In Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club,'57
the same court stated "[a] relator's ability to recognize the legal
consequences of a publicly disclosed fraudulent transaction does
of the violation alnot alter the fact that the material elements
1' 58
ready have been publicly disclosed.'

2. Court Interpretations of the Enumerated Means By Which
Allegations or Transactions Must be
Publicly Disclosed

Not only must there be a "public disclosure" of "allegations
or transactions," but also the allegations or transactions must be
publicly disclosed "in a criminal, civil or administrative hearing,
in a congressional, administrative or Government Accounting
Office report, hearing, audit or investigation, or from the news
media."'1 59 The courts have taken different approaches in deter154. United States ex rel. Branhan v. Mercy Health System of Southwest Ohio,
No. 98-3127, 1999 WL 618018, at *8 (6th Cir. Aug. 5, 1999) (unpublished disposition).
155. Id.
156. Springfield, 14 F.3d at 655. But see United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166
F.3d 853, 864 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining, in dicta, that it may be possible for an individual to be an original source in an unusually complex situation where pieces of
information are disclosed but the fraud itself is hidden until some astute plaintiff puts
the pieces into perspective).
157. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675(D.C. Cir. 1997).
158. Id. at 688; see also A-1 Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. California, 202 F.3d 1238,
1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting relator's argument that its unique knowledge removes
jurisdictional bar).
159. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1994). Since there are no modifying words (e.g.,
"such as") in this provision preceding the list to indicate that what follows are merely
examples, the list of appropriate modes of disclosure appears to be exhaustive. However, at least one court has held otherwise. Compare United States ex rel. Dunleavy
v. County of Delaware, 123 F.3d 734, 744 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that list is exhaustive), with United States ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Sciences, Inc., 99 F.3d 1000, 1004
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mining what constitutes a "hearing," an "administrative report,"
and an "administrative investigation."
The Third Circuit broadly interpreted criminal, civil or administrative hearings to include "allegations and information disclosed in connection with civil, criminal, or administrative
litigation. 160 Thus, the court determined that discovery proceedings are proceedings in a civil lawsuit.16 1 The Third Circuit also
determined that the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development's ("HUD") response to an FOIA request
constituted an "administrative ... report" and that the response
occurred "in a[n] . .. administrative . . . investigation" as required by 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 62 The District of Columbia Circuit similarly
held that "hearing" is synonymous with
"proceeding. ' 163 Relying on the District of Columbia Circuit, in
a recent case the Ninth Circuit decided that extensive proceedings of the Emergency Medical Services Agency and its governing entity are administrative hearings under section
3730(e)(4)(A).1 64 In a recent case, the Fourth Circuit broadly
interpreted an "administrative hearing" to include the filing of
an administrative complaint that was not under seal. 165 A number of courts have also rejected the argument that administra-

(10th Cir. 1996) (stating that the list does not identify the only means by which public
disclosure can occur).
160. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149,
1156 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 1161; accord United States ex rel. Mistick v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376, 385 (3d Cir. 1998); United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1350 (4th Cir. 1994); see e.g. United States ex rel. Kreindler &
Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1158 (2d Cir. 1993); United States ex
rel. Precision Co., 971 F.2d 548, 554 n.5 (10th Cir. 1992); cf Springfield, 14 F.3d at 652
(finding that public disclosure occurs when documents are filed with an agency or
court during administrative proceedings or civil litigation); A-1 Ambulance Serv., 202
F.3d at 1243-44 (same).
162. Mistick, 186 F.3d at 383-84. The court stated that "HUD's response to the
FOIA request originated with the department of the federal government and constituted official federal government action, and therefore this response plainly satisfie[s
the] definition of 'administrative'." Id. at 383; see also United States ex rel. Burns v.
A.D. Roe Co., 186 F.3d 717, 723-24 (6th Cir. 1999); Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 745; United
States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1520 (9th Cir. 1995),
vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
163. Springfield, 14 F.3d at 652.
164. A- Ambulance Serv., 202 F.3d at 1243-44.
165. United States ex rel. Grayson v. Advanced Mgmt. Tech., Inc., 221 F.3d 580,
582 (4th Cir. 2000).
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tive hearings must be federal
in nature in order for the public
1 66
disclosure bar to apply.
3.

Court Interpretations of When A Qui Tam Action Is
"Based Upon" A Public Disclosure

Whether or not allegations or transactions are "based upon"
the public disclosure is also construed differently by the courts.
In assessing this element, the courts have considered whether
the allegations or transactions have to be similar to the public
disclosure or whether they must be directly derived from the
public disclosure.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Siller con1 67
cluded that "based upon" means actually "derived from.'
The court looked at the plain meaning of "based upon," which
was defined as to "use as a basis for," and thus determined that
"[a] relator's action is 'based upon' a public disclosure of allegations only where the relator has actually derived from that disclosure the allegations upon which his qui tam action is
based."1

68

In contrast to the Fourth Circuit, the majority of the courts
have interpreted "based upon" to mean "substantially similar
to" or "supported by." The Second Circuit determined that a
relator's allegations were "based upon" a public disclosure because they were, in essence, "[tihe same as those that had been
publicly disclosed prior to the filing of the qui tam suit ... regardless of where the relator obtained his information. '169 The
166. A-i Ambulance Serv., 202 F.3d at 1244. Although the court in Dunleavy determined that "administrative" when used in conjunction with "report" must be a
federal report, Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 744, this decision is not inconsistent with those
courts that have determined that "administrative" when used in conjunction with
"hearings" does not require federal origination. Since the word "administrative" is
used twice in § 3730(e)(4)(A), it is logical to conclude that Congress did not intend to
limit "criminal, civil or administrative hearings" only to federal hearings. On the
other hand, since "congressional, administrative, or [GAO] report, hearing, audit or
investigation" are grouped together in a second separate categorization, Congress
likely intended "report, hearing, audit or investigation" in this context to originate
with the federal government.
167. United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1348
(4th Cir. 1994); accord United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 863 (7th
Cir. 1999) (stating that "based upon" is not synonymous with "similar to" but can be
substituted for "derived from").
168. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1348 (quoting WEBSTER'S TnRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY 180 (1986)).
169. United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 324 (2d Cir. 1992);
accord McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 940 (6th Cir. 1997) ("In
construing 'based upon' to mean 'supported by' we effectively preclude individuals
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Tenth Circuit similarly determined that "based upon" is understood to mean "supported by."' 170 The test for determining "supported by" is whether "substantial identity" exists between the
publicly disclosed
allegations or transactions and the relator's
71
complaint.1
Some courts have taken this interpretation a step farther by
delineating the extent to which the relator's allegations or transactions must be "based upon" the public disclosure. In line with
this interpretation, the Tenth Circuit determined that if the relator's action is "partly based upon publicly disclosed allegations
or transactions," then that action is "based upon" such allegations or transactions.172 In rejecting the relator's argument that
the action must be "solely" based upon the publicly disclosed
information, the court explained: "To insert the term 'solely'
into § 3730(e)(4)(A) would impermissibly expand federal jurisdiction by allowing qui tam plaintiffs to avoid the more exacting
'original source' requirement simply by asserting an additional
count. "173
Based on the above, in order to successfully assert the public
disclosure bar, the defendant must show that the information in
the relator's complaint was based upon a public disclosure, of
allegations or transactions, in an appropriate medium (e.g., a
civil, criminal or administrative hearing, etc.). The outcome for
the defendant will be contingent upon how broadly or narrowly
the court interprets this language, and how carefully the court
examines each necessary requirement. For example, the relator
would benefit from a narrow interpretation of "public disclosure" to require "actual" versus "theoretical" disclosure. In
who base any part of their allegation on publicly disclosed information from bringing
a qui tam suit."); Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 19 F.3d 562, 566-67 (11th Cir.
1994); United States ex rel. Kriendler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d
1148, 1158 (2d Cir. 1993); Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1417 (9th Cir. 1992).
170.
United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indust., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552
(10th Cir. 1992); accord United States ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., 161 F.3d 533, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1998); United States ex rel. Findley v.
FPC-Boron Employee's Club, 105 F.3d 675, 682-84 (D.C. Cir. 1997); McKenzie, 123
F.3d at 940; United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson, 99 F.3d 1538, 1545 (10th Cir.
1996); Cooper, 19 F.3d at 567; United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v.
Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 652-55 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Kreindler, 985 F.2d at 1158; Wang, 975
F.2d at 1419; Doe, 960 F.2d at 324.
171. Precision Co., 971 F.2d at 552; accord MK-Ferguson, 99 F.3d at 1545; cf. Findley, 105 F.3d at 688 (holding that public disclosure applies because relator's complaint
"merely echoes publicly disclosed ... transactions.").
172. Precision Co., 971 F.2d at 552; accord Kreindler, 985 F.2d at 1158.
173. Precision Co., 971 F.2d at 552; accord MK-Ferguson, 99 F.3d at 1546-47.
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contrast, the defendant would benefit from a finding that "public" is a disclosure to any person rather than to the public at
large.
Also, a court's failure to consider each necessary requirement
for a "public disclosure" may result in the defendant's successful
assertion of the jurisdictional bar. For example, a defendant
may be able to successfully assert the jurisdictional bar if the
court finds there has been a "public disclosure" but fails to analyze whether the information in the public disclosure rises to the
level of "allegations or transactions." Similarly, the defendant
may prevail if a court finds there has been a "public disclosure"
of "allegations or transactions," but fails to analyze whether the
information contained in the relator's complaint was actually
"based upon" such allegations or transactions, or whether the
allegations or transactions were publicly disclosed in an appropriate medium.
If the defendant is successful in showing that an appropriate
"public disclosure" has occurred, the relator can still circumvent
the jurisdictional bar if he or she is the "original source" of the
information publicly disclosed. The next section discusses the
divergent court interpretations of the "original source"
provision.
B.

Who is an OriginalSource?

The original source provision is relevant only if the defendant
has proven that the allegations or transactions were publicly disclosed by an appropriate statutory means, and the relator's action is based upon the information publicly disclosed. 174 If so,
then the defendant can invoke the jurisdictional bar unless the
relator is the original source of the information that was publicly
disclosed. 175 As mentioned above, the Act defines "original
source" as an "individual who has direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are
based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action.., which is based on the information.' 1 76 Thus, in order to be an original source, the
individual must show that s/he (1) has direct knowledge; (2) has
174. See, e.g., Mackenzie, 123 F.3d at 938-39; Wang, 975 F.3d at 1417 (stating that
"[o]ne only need be an 'original source' of one's information if one's allegation has
been publicly disclosed ....").
175. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1994).
176. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
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independent knowledge; and (3) voluntarily provided the information to the government before filing an action. In addition to
these requirements, some courts require that the relator be the
person who provided the information to the entity that made
the public disclosure,177 whereas others have explicitly rejected
this additional requirement. 178 Also, some courts have determined that the relator must have disclosed the information to
the government before the public disclosure occurred.179
1.

Court Interpretations of When a Relator Has "Direct and
Independent Knowledge"

To be an original source, the relator must have both "direct"
and "independent" knowledge of the information on which the
allegations of fraud are based. While these two elements are
distinct, many courts interpret them simultaneously. Taken together, "direct and independent knowledge of information on
which the allegations are based refers to direct and independent
knowledge of any essential element of the underlying fraud
transaction. '180 "Direct" has been interpreted to mean (1) firsthand knowledge, 81 in the sense that the relator must actually
177. Kreindler, 985 F.2d at 1159 (stating that since it was not demonstrated that
the original complaint relied on information disclosed by appellants before they filed
the complaint, the appellants could not be the "original source" of publicly disclosed
information); United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16
(2d Cir. 1990); Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418 (stating that a qui tam plaintiff "must have
directly or indirectly been the source to the entity that publicly disclosed the allegations on which a suit is based).
178. United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1355
(4th Cir. 1994) (holding that the relator does not need to be the source that provided
the allegations on which the action is based to the disclosing entity in order to be an
original source); United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 865 (7th Cir.
1998) (same); United States ex rel. Findley, 105 F.3d 675, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same);
United States ex rel. Fine v, Advanced Sciences, Inc., 99 F.3d 1000, 1006-07 (10th Cir.
1996) (same).
179. Findley, 105 F.3d at 690 (holding that the relator must have filed suit before
the disclosure occurred); Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d at 866 (same); McKenzie, 123
F.3d at 942 (holding that the relator must have filed suit before the disclosure occurred and must have been the source providing the information to the government).
180. United States ex rel. Springfield v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(stating that relator must have "'direct independent knowledge' of any essential element of the underlying fraud transaction").
181. United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th
Cir. 1999) (stating that the relator had "direct" knowledge because he observed defendant's actions firsthand); cf Eitel v. United States, No. 99-35099, 2000 WL
1529237, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 16, 2000) (explaining that relator's knowledge was not
direct and independent because he discovered the information alleging fraud secondhand rather than discovering the information firsthand) (unpublished); Fine, 99 F.3d
at 1007 (stating that secondhand knowledge is not "direct and independent" since it is
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see the fraudulent activity with his or her own eyes, 112 (2)
"marked by the absence of an intervening agency,"1 83 and (3)
"gained by the relator's own efforts and not required from labors of others."'18 4 As an additional requirement, the District
Court of Columbia requires the relator to have direct knowledge of the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, not
just direct knowledge of the information in his or her complaint. 185 Under these definitions, individuals who have "direct"
knowledge are typically employees of defendant or other close
observers who witnessed the fraudulent activity. 186 However,
despite having direct knowledge, some courts have found that
individuals who do not have firsthand knowledge of the fraud
cannot qualify as original sources. 187
based on the work of others); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that the
relator did not have direct knowledge because the information came through two
intermediaries).
182. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1417; see also United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson
Co., 99 F.3d 1538, 1548 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that the relator did not have direct
knowledge because he was "not an observer of the purported fraud").
183. Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160. Accord United States ex rel. Grayson v. Advanced
Mgmt. Tech., Inc., 221 F.3d 580, 583 (4th Cir. 2000) (determining that attorney-relators did not use their own efforts to uncover allegations of fraud); Springfield, 14 F.3d
at 656.
184. Fine, 99 F.3d at 1006-07 (explaining that the relator did not have direct
knowledge because knowledge came from work of auditors not through his own labor); see also MK-Ferguson, 99 F.3d at 1548 (stating that the relator did not have
direct knowledge because "he did not himself discover the allegedly fraudulent
practices.").
185. United States ex rel. Findley, 105 F.3d 675, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
186. See, e.g., Springfield, 14 F.3d at 359 (finding relators had direct knowledge of
the fraud because they learned of the fraud through their "own efforts and experience, which ... included personal knowledge of the arbitration proceedings and interviews with individuals and businesses identified in the telephone records."); Wang,
975 F.2d at 1417-18 (finding relator-employee to have direct knowledge of the fraud
because "he saw [it] with his own eyes" and his knowledge was "unmediated by anything but [his] own labor."); Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, 19 F.3d
562, 568 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding the relator had direct knowledge because he acquired knowledge of the fraud "through three years of his own claims processing,
research, and correspondence with members of Congress and HCFA").
187. See, e.g., Findley, 105 F.3d at 676 (holding that despite the relator's direct
knowledge of the allegations in the complaint derived from a conference he attended,
relator did not have direct knowledge because he did not have firsthand knowledge
of the information that had been placed in the public domain over the previous forty
years); United States ex rel. Kriendler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d
1148, 1159 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that despite the relator's additional research and
investigation, he did not have direct knowledge because he was not "the source of the
core information"); United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d
548, 554 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that the relator does not have direct knowledge
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"Independent" has been interpreted to mean that the information known by the relator does not depend or rely upon the
public disclosure. 88 In Houck on behalf of the United States v.
Folding Administration Committee, 89 the Seventh Circuit explained that a relator does not have "independent" knowledge if
he or she would not have learned of the information absent public disclosure. 190 Similarly, in United States ex rel. Precision Co.
v. Koch Industries, Inc., the Tenth Circuit determined that investigations that are "merely continuations of, or derived from previous investigations" are not "independent" investigations.' 9' In
quantifying the amount of information a relator must possess,
the Third Circuit explained that while "it is not necessary for a
relator to have all the relevant information in order to qualify as
'independent,' the relator must possess substantive information
about the particular fraud which enables a putative relator to
understand the significance of a publicly disclosed transaction or
192
allegation.
Another consideration that has arisen in the context of analyzing independent knowledge is whether the relator's knowledge is independent of the public disclosure if she has special
expertise that permitted her to understand the significance of
the information disclosed. The Second Circuit rejected the argument that a plaintiff's background knowledge enabling him to
understand the significance of the information contained in the
court files was enough to make his knowledge "independent" of
the publicly disclosed information. 193 In fact, the court exbecause the relator's knowledge was information derived from other individual's
investigations).
188. Houck on behalf of the United States v. Folding Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d
494, 505 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that there is no evidence that plaintiff would have
learned about the claims without public disclosure). Accord Grayson, 221 F.3d at 583;
Springfield, 14 F.3d at 656; Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160.
189. Houck on behalf of the United States v. Folding Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d
494, 505 (7th Cir. 1989)
190. Id.; accord Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160; see also United States ex rel. Mistick v.
Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376, 389 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the relator
did not have "direct and independent" knowledge because the critical elements of its
claim were learned from a FOIA request.); Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419 (stating that "A
'whistleblower' sounds the alarm; he does not echo it. The Act rewards those brave
enough to speak in the face of a 'conspiracy of silence' and not their mimics.") (citing
S. REP. No. 99-345, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5271).
191. United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 554
(10th Cir. 1992).
192. Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160.
193. United States ex rel. Kriendler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d
1148, 1159 (2d Cir. 1993).
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plained, if the plaintiff's argument prevailed then "a cryptographer who translated a ciphered document in a public court
record would be an 'original source,' [which is] an unlikely interpretation of the phrase." 194 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit recently determined that "specialized" experience as government
contract lawyers did not make attorney-relators an "original
5
source."

2.

19

Court Interpretations of Whether the Information Was
"Voluntarily Provided"

An "original source" must not only have "direct and independent" knowledge, but also must have "voluntarily" provided the
information on which the publicly disclosed allegations are
based to the government before filing suit. 196 The plain meaning
of the word "voluntary" is "unconstrained by interference;
unimpelled by another's influence; spontaneous; acting of oneself... [p]roceeding from the free and unrestrained will of the
person . . . resulting from free choice, without compulsion or
solicitation.' 1 97 In explaining why the requirement for an individual to "voluntarily" disclose the information of fraudulent actions was added to the FCA, Senator Grassley stated that the
requirement "[i]s meant to preclude the ability of an individual
to sue under the qui tam section of the False Claims Act when
... the individual was a source of the allegations only because
the individual was subpenaed [sic] to come forward." 198
Generally, the courts find that the relator cannot be incentivized, required or compelled to disclose the fraudulent information, but rather must willingly choose to come forward with
the information. 99 Additionally, some courts require the relator to voluntarily provide the information to the government
194. Id. (quoting Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160).
195. United States ex rel. Grayson v. Advanced Mgmt. Tech., Inc., 221 F.3d 580,
583 (4th Cir. 2000).
196. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (1994).
197. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY ABRIDGED 1088 (6th ed. 1991).
198. 132 CONG. REc. S11238-04 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
199. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740, 74344 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that an employee who is required to uncover
fraud as part of job responsibility does not voluntarily disclose information); United
States v. Reagan, No. 99-15847, 2000 WL 152936, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 16, 2000) (same)
(unpublished); United States ex rel. Leblanc v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 913 F.3d 17, 20 (1st
Cir. 1990) (same).
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before the public disclosure, not just before the complaint is
filed.200
Thus, whether a relator is an "original source" will depend
upon the court interpretation. For example, in a jurisdiction
that requires the relator to be the informant to the disclosing
entity, a relator would not be an "original source" even if he or
she had "direct" and "independent" knowledge of the information publicly disclosure, but did not provide the information to
the disclosing entity. Also, a relator would not be an "original
source" in a jurisdiction requiring the relator to provide the
publicly disclosed information to the government prior to disclosure, if he or she did not do so.
C. The Judiciary's Role in Improving the FCA
The conflicting interpretations of the jurisdictional bar indicate the latent defects in the textual drafting of the qui tam provisions. The ultimate goal of the provisions should be to strike a
balance between encouraging private individuals with inside information to report fraudulent activity, and preventing parasitic
lawsuits by individuals who seek to take advantage of an opportunistic situation and provide no service to the government.20 '
Although the 1986 Amendments sought to achieve this middle
ground, the interpretation of the various words in the public disclosure bar can be skewed to favor either side. This section proposes how the provisions should be interpreted to regain the
equilibrium between these competing extremes.
1.

How to Interpret "Public Disclosure"

Qui tam lawsuits are becoming increasingly popular. More
than 3,000 qui tam suits have been filed since 1986.202 Of these
cases, more than 53% have been brought in the last three
years.20 3 After all, with recent fraud settlements in the hundreds
200. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club, 105
F.3d 675, 690-91 (D.C. Cir. 1996); accord United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166
F.3d 853, 866 (7th Cir. 1999).
201. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry, Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649
(D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Seeking the golden mean between adequate incentives for whistleblowing insiders with genuinely valuable information and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute of their own, Congress has frequently altered its course in drafting and amending the qui tam provisions
since initial passage of the FCA over a century ago.").
202. W. Jay DelVecchio, Qui Tam Action: Some Practical Considerations, SE34
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 479 (1999).
203. Id.
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of million dollars range, who wouldn't want to receive a percentage of the recovery?2 04 Qui tam relators are unquestionably
lured by the prospect of financial utopia. 20 5 Hence, their interests are not aligned with those of the government. In the intuitive words of the Supreme Court:
As a class of plaintiffs qui tam relators are different in kind
than the Government. They are motivated primarily by the
prospects of monetary reward rather than public good ....
Qui tam relators are thus less likely than is the Government to
forgo an action arguably based on a mere technical noncompliance with reporting
requirements that involved no harm to the
20 6
public fisc.

For precisely these reasons, the "public disclosure bar" needs
to be carefully interpreted so that public plunderers do not take
advantage an opportunistic situation.
a. Meaning of "Public" and "Allegations or Transactions"
First, what does "public" mean? On its face the word connotes "more than one. '20 7 Also, the common sense understanding of the word "public" suggests an element of "openness" or
"discoverability. ' 20 8 "Disclosure" on its face suggests something
that is "revealed. ' 20 9 Thus, information regarding fraud passed
from one person to another (e.g., from one employee to another) is not a public disclosure, unless that information is available to the general public (i.e., available to "strangers to the
204. See, e.g., Press Release, Department of Justice, Attorney GeneralAnnounces
Largest Department of Justice FraudSettlement In History (December 2000), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2000/ December/697ag.htm (announcing that The
Healthcare Company-formerly known as Columbia/HCA-agreed to pay a settlement
of $745 million, plus interest, for alleged false billing practices); Fraud and Abuse:
Fresenius Sued By Private Insurers Following Guilty Plea in Medicare Fraud Case,
Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA), at d12 (Feb. 23, 2000) (stating that Fresenius Medical
Care, a provider of dialysis services in the United States, agreed to pay $385 million in
civil fines to settle FCA charges).
205. One of the changes in the 1943 Amendments decreased the amount of the
relator's reward from 50% to 25%. In a statement by Representative Walter, he
explained:
Those people who have been interested in informer suits who appeared
before the subcommittee and the conferees, have objected to the 25% provision. When we pinned them down to the reason for their objection it was
that they felt they ought to get more money for rendering a very doubtful
service.
89 CONG. REC. 10846 (1943).
206. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (1997).
207. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY ABRIDGED 854 (6th ed. 1991).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 320.
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fraud" 210 ). However, the context of "public disclosure" becomes complicated when considering the distinction between
"actual" and "theoretical" disclosure. For example, if something
is available via FOIA, but has not been requested by anyone, it
is theoretically available, but until the request is produced, it is
not publicly disclosed. 211 "Public accessibility" should not be
confused with "public disclosure." As the Third Circuit noted:
Information may be publicly disclosed-for example, it may
appear buried in an exhibit that is filed in court without fanfare in an obscure case-and yet not readily accessible to the
general public. And information may be easily accessible to
the public-it may be available under FOIA to anyone who
simply files a request-but unless there is a request and the
information is actually produced, it is not publicly disclosed.212
Information available through FOIA is publicly disclosed
when the requesting party receives the information. 213 The
FOIA's primary purpose is to ensure that government activities
are "opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny. ' 214 Based on
the Supreme Court opinion in Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,21 5 there is a good chance the
Court would find that FOIA requests trigger public disclosure.
In that case, the Court held that the disclosure of information
pursuant to FOIA constitutes a "public disclosure" within the
meaning of the Consumer Product Safety Act.21 6 Specifically,
the Court stated: "As a matter of common usage the term 'public' is properly understood as including persons who are FOIA
requesters. A disclosure pursuant to the FOIA would thus seem
to be most accurately characterized as a 'public disclosure'
within the plain meaning of [the Consumer Product Safety
Act]." 2 17 Following this reasoning, information obtained
through a HCFA report listing Medicare reimbursements of a
210. United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1155-56 (3d Cir. 1990).
211. United States ex reL Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1520 (9th
Cir. 1995) (explaining that "[iun the FOIA context, information cannot be deemed
disclosed until a member of the public requests the information and receives it from
the government.").
212. United States ex rel. Mistick v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376,
383 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999).
213. See supra note 141 for case law discussion of a FOIA "public disclosure."
214. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 774 (1989).
215. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102
(1980).
216. Id. at 102.
217. Id. at 108-109.
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health care entity is publicly disclosed because it is available to
anyone who requests it.2 18 Also, since HCFA is an agency, the
report listing Medicare reimbursements is derived from an administrative investigation. 19
Perhaps more significant is whether the "publicly disclosed"
information rises to the level of "allegations or transactions."
The publicly disclosed "allegations or transactions" must contain
some indication of an inference of fraudulent activity which can
be discerned by a reasonable person. Information alone should
not be enough to trigger the jurisdictional bar, 220 but the courts
should be extremely lenient in determining an inference of
fraud. Any discernable indication of fraudulent activity from
any publicly disclosed information should give rise to "allegations or transactions." For example, if information obtained
from HCFA records is the sole basis for a relator's complaint, in
some instances an argument can be made that the information
contained in the record rises to the level of allegations or transactions. The cases can be distinguished by comparing an individual who is made aware of a specific existence of fraud and
simply finds information confirming such fraud with an individual who has no prior knowledge of a particular fraud but uncovers fraud using his own diligence or ingenuity.
To illustrate, suppose the government announces a national
initiative focusing on fraudulent billing practices in the area of
pneumonia coding. Subsequent to this announcement, if an individual uses information from HCFA records to bring a lawsuit
against a hospital for unusually high incidents of complicated
pneumonia, the information derived from the HCFA form contains "allegations" of fraud. However, if there is no inference of
fraud alleged in a particular area or by a particular industry, and
an individual uses his own skills or knowledge to deduce fraudulent behavior, then the information derived from the HCFA
records would not rise to the level of allegations or transactions.22 ' If individuals were allowed to wait for the government
218. United States ex rel. Branhan v. Mercy Health Sys. of S.W., No. 98-3127, 1999
WL 618018, at *2 (6th Cir. 1999).
219. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 323-24
(2d Cir. 1992).
220. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir. 1992).
221. This situation should not to be confused with cases in which a relator argues
that his expertise in a particular area or his special ability to make sense of information bars jurisdiction where all material elements of fraud are already publicly disclosed. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
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to announce its fraud focus and then request information on
providers related to that particular area, the Act would encourage a plethora of opportunistic individuals to file qui tam
lawsuits. This is exactly what the jurisdictional bar intends to
prevent.
b.

Enumerated List of Public Disclosure Mediums

In the absence of any words of limitation (e.g., "such as"), the
statute suggests that "in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the
news media..." is an exhaustive listing of appropriate modes of
disclosure.222 However, "hearing" and "investigation" should be
loosely interpreted. In accordance with the opinion of the Third
Circuit in Stinson, "hearings" should include any allegations
and/or transactions "disclosed in connection with a civil, criminal
or administrative [hearing]. 2 2 3 Therefore, any information disclosed in discovery proceedings, pre-trial motions, etc. would be
considered to be "in connection with" a hearing.
Also, there is nothing in the statute indicating that a "civil,
criminal, or administrative hearing" applies only to federal civil,
criminal and administrative hearings. In fact, because the statute lists "administrative hearings" twice in the same sentence,
with the second listing being in a congressional context, logic
infers that the first listing is not in the congressional context. It
is unlikely that the legislators would repeat "administrative
hearing" twice in the same provision if they had intended each
to have the same meaning. Thus, the courts should avoid inferring this restriction.
c.

Meaning of "Based Upon"

As discussed above, the courts disagree as to whether "based
upon" means "derived from" or "supported by."' 224 The Fourth
Circuit in United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton, Dickinson &
Co. 225 examined the plain meaning of the words "based upon"
222. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1994); United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County
of Delaware, 123 F.3d 734, 744 (3d Cir. 1997).
223. United States ex rel.Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1156 (3d Cir. 1990).
224. See supra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of whether "based upon" means "derived from" or "supported by."
225. United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d. 1339 (4th
Cir. 1994).

Published by LAW eCommons, 2001

39

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 10 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 8

230

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 10

(i.e., to "use as a basis for") to infer that the words mean "derived from. ' 226 Although the Fourth Circuit's rationale is the
minority approach, the logic behind the court's reasoning is consistent with the purpose of the public disclosure provision. The
purpose of the public disclosure bar is to keep individuals out of
the lawsuit who heard information of fraudulent activities elsewhere, unless that individual was the original source of the information. Therefore, a relator should be prohibited from
entering the lawsuit if the information which serves as the basis
for his complaint was taken or "derived from" the actual public
disclosure. To say that the relator's complaint need only be
"supported by" the public disclosure ignores the necessary tangential connection between the information in the relator's complaint and the information in the public disclosure.
However, more significant is the distinction between whether
the relator's complaint must be "solely" based upon or "partly"
based upon the public disclosure.227 The argument that the information must be "solely" based upon the publicly disclosed
allegations or transactions again reads into the text a requirement that does not exist. Congress could have chosen to specify
that the relator's complaint must be "solely" based upon the
public disclosure if it intended that result. Since Congress did
not choose to do so, information contained in the complaint that
is based "partly" upon the public disclosure should be sufficient
to invoke the jurisdictional bar (assuming the relator does not
have original source status). To allow otherwise would permit
individuals to circumvent the jurisdictional bar by adding a few
components to the complaint which slightly vary from the public
disclosure and are therefore not "solely" based upon the disclosure. 228 This narrow interpretation would encourage parasitic
lawsuits.
2.

How to Interpret "Original Source"

The existence of the "original source" provision supports the
notion that the FCA intends to encourage only those individuals
who have actually seen the fraudulent activity to come forward
226. Id. at 1347-50.
227. See supra Part III.A.3.
228. In Precision Co., the Tenth Circuit stated: "[W]ith a little artful pleading, all
qui tam plaintiffs could pass the jurisdictional threshold by fashioning complaints only
'partly based' upon publicly disclosed allegations or transactions." United States ex
rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552 (10th Cir. 1992).
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with their information. In the words of Senator Grassley, one of
the sponsors of the 1986 FCA amendments:
The most effective way to catch fraud or other wrongdoing
is to have 'insider' information. Insiders help make investigations more targeted, more effective and more efficient. Congress has long recognized the value of insiders. That is why
Congress established laws to encourage and protect whistle
blowers.229
Similarly, a 1986 Senate report indicated, "[d]etecting fraud is
usually very difficult without the cooperation of the individuals
who are either close observers or otherwise involved in the
fraudulent activity. ' 230 Furthermore, the plain meaning of a
"whistleblower" means "an employee who refuses to engage in
and/or reports illegal or wrongful activities of his employer or
fellow employees. "231 The "original source" provision speaks
specifically to these types of individuals as indicated by the "direct" and "independent" requirement. However, it includes not
only employees, but for example, any individual who may stumble upon the fraudulent activity and actually observe the unlawful practices. Thus, if there is a public disclosure, the "true
insider" is protected because he or she has "direct" knowledge
of the publicly disclosed information. As indicated by some of
the courts of appeals, the logical interpretation of the word "direct" refers to an individual who has firsthand knowledge.
Additionally, not only must an individual have "direct"
knowledge, but this knowledge must also be "independent."
This means the relator must obtain the information via his or
her own efforts rather than through the efforts of others. For
example, if employee A tells employee B about the fraudulent
practices of his employer, and employee B sees the fraud and
reports it, employee B will likely not have "independent"
knowledge because it was not procured through his own efforts.
An "original source" must also "voluntarily" provide the information to the government before filing suit. The word voluntary is clear on its face-it means "resulting from free choice,
229. 144 CONG. REC. S7675-02 at 7676 (daily ed. July 8, 1998).
230. S.REP. No. 99-345, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269; see also
Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that "qui tam suits are
meant to encourage private insiders privy to a fraud on the government to blow the
whistle on the crime."); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamonte,
P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1990) (referring to the paradigm qui tam plaintiff as the "whistleblowing insider").
231. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY ABRIDGED 1596 (6th ed. 1991) (emphasis
added).
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without compulsion or solicitation."2 3 2 Therefore, the act of disclosing the information to the government before the public disclosure must be a result of the relator's free will. The FCA
enough to speak in the face of a "conspirrewards those brave
233
silence.
of
acy
Lastly, some courts have read into the statute an additional
requirement that the relator play a role in disclosing the public
information. In other words, the relator must have been the individual who provided the information to the disclosing entity.
There is nothing in the language of the statute or the legislative
history that indicates the intent or need for such a requirement.
In fact, it is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute. For
example, if an individual brought information to the government concerning the fraudulent billing practice of his employer,
and the press was informed of this allegation and printed it in
the paper, that individual is still the "original source" of the information. To prevent such an individual from taking part in the
lawsuit because he was not the individual who provided the
press with the information would completely abrogate the intended purpose of the "original source" provision. There is no
need for this requirement once the relator can show she had
"direct and independent" knowledge of information and voluntarily provided such information to the government before the
disclosure.
By interpreting the "public disclosure bar" in a manner consistent with the intended purpose of the Act, the judiciary would
help clarify the inconsistent applications of this provision. The
next section examines role of the legislature in remedying some
of the current problems with the Act.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

Since the 1986 Amendments, there have been a number of
proposals seeking, once again, to amend the FCA. This section
focuses on some of the significant bills introduced in Congress in
order to analyze current criticisms of the Act, and to evaluate
the potential validity and viability of such proposals as a means
of correcting some of the problems that still exist.

232.
233.

Id. at 1575.
S. REP. No. 99-345, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5271.
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A.

False Claims Amendments Act of 1992

The False Claims Amendments Act of 1992234 ("FCAA of

1992") proposed a number of changes. In pertinent part, the
FCAA of 1992 would again have revised the public disclosure
jurisdictional bar.235 Specifically, the FCAA of 1992 would have
revised the entire public disclosure bar to insure that a court

would not have jurisdiction over an action in which all the material facts of a cause of action were obtained from a media report
or a disclosure to the general public of a document (1) created

by the Federal Government; (2) filed in a lawsuit to which the
Federal Government is a party; or (3) relating to an active investigation by the Federal Government-unless the individual
bringing the action was the original source of such material information.236 The proposed amendment would have redefined
"original source" to mean an individual with independent
knowledge of the material facts and allegations, who has volun234. H.R. 4563, 102d Cong. (1992). This bill was passed in the House by voice
vote on August 11, 1992, and was received in the Senate and read twice and referred
to the Committee on Judiciary on August 12, 1992. However, the bill died in the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 4563, 102d Cong. (1992), availableat http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi/bin/bdquery/D?... /-bdQN9J:@@@L--/bss/dlO2query.htm.
235. In one report the House Committee on the Judiciary explained that "clarifications.., are necessary in light of a number of incorrect interpretations of the parasitic suit ban in the current Act." H.R. REP. No. 837, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1992).
In addition to the proposal to revise the public disclosure jurisdictional bar, the
FCAA of 1992 also would have placed limitations on government employees filing qui
tam actions, see H.R. 4563, 102d Cong., § 1, and it would have amended the
whistleblower protection, id. § 5. Regarding federal employees filing qui tam actions,
it would have allowed the government to dismiss a qui tam relator from the action if
the relator was a government employee and (1) before bringing the action the employee failed to disclose all material evidence and information that relates to the
cause of action in issue to the Inspector General (or, in cases where there is no Inspector General, disclosed the information to the Attorney General); (2) before
bringing the action the employee failed to notify his or her supervisor and the Attorney General (where the employing agency has an Inspector General); and (3) the
Attorney General had not filed an action based on such information within twelve
months of the disclosure of such information (unless the Attorney General had filed
an extension of the twelve-month period, and was granted such extension). Id. § 2;
cf.S. 2785 IS, 102nd Cong. § 3 (1992). The False Claims Technical Amendment Act of
1992 would have prohibited court jurisdiction over any action that is based, in whole
or in part, upon information obtained in the course or scope of government employment. However, this bill died in the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative
Practice. The FCAA of 1992 would have protected whistleblowers where an employee could show by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's retaliatory
action against the employee was based on the lawful filing of a cause of action against
the employer, unless, the employer could show by clear and convincing evidence that
the action would have been taken against the employee regardless of the lawful cause
of action filed. Id. § 5.
236. Id. § 3.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2001

43

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 10 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 8

234

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 10

tarily provided them to the Government.237 The person bringing
the action would also have been an "original source" of any additional material facts or allegations that were developed as a
result of the information he or she provided to the Government. 238 The FCAA of 1992 would have eliminated the requirement that the qui tam relator must have "direct" knowledge of
the falsity.
The FCAA of 1992 also would have eliminated all the enumerated outlets of public disclosure, with the exception of news
media reports and documents that are created by the government, filed in a lawsuit where the government is a party, or related to a current government investigation, unless the
individual was an "original source" of the information.239 Such a
change would allow, for example, an individual who obtained
public information via a state civil, criminal, or administrative
hearing, and who had no prior knowledge of fraud, to bring a
lawsuit as a qui tam relator in federal court (so long as the federal government had no knowledge of the fraud). This example
is only one of the many possible situations that could occur if
the public disclosure provision was construed in this way. Furthermore, the elimination of the "direct" requirement from the
"original source" provision would create the potential for "parasitic" individuals, who have no firsthand knowledge of the alleged fraudulent activity, to bring a lawsuit as a qui tam relator.
The addition of the modifier "general" also would have
broadened the interpretation of "public." Since "general" is defined as "pertaining to ... the ... class, as distinguished from
that which characterizes the . . . individual, ' ' 240 the addition of
this word would have required a wider dissemination of the disclosed allegations or transactions before they were considered
"public." Not only would this encourage "parasitic" suits, but it
would also open the floodgates to litigation over what constitutes disclosure to the general public (e.g., how many people
comprise "general"?).

237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id.
Id.
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY ABRIDGED
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B.

The False Claims Amendments Act of 1993

The False Claims Amendments Act of 1993241 ("FCAA of
1993") was very similar to the FCAA of 1992 in many respects. 242 The Senate version of the FCAA of 1993 would have
eliminated, rather than replaced, the public disclosure jurisdictional bar from the Act, and instead would have allowed the
government to dismiss a relator from an action in certain situations.2 43 Specifically, the government could dismiss the relator if
(1) the material facts which served as the basis for the cause of
action were derived from an open fraud investigation that the
executive branch of the government was actively pursuing, or
(2) the relator learned of the information underlying the fraudulent violation in the course of his or her employment and failed
to take certain administrative steps. 2 44 However, the FCAA of
1993 would have provided an opportunity for the relator to contest a government motion to dismiss, which would not be made
public without the relator's consent and which would not be
subject to discovery by the defendant.245
About three months after the FCAA of 1993 was introduced
in the Senate, a similar bill was introduced in the House. 46 In
pertinent part, the House bill would have allowed the government to dismiss a relator from an action if the relator "learned
241. S. 841, 103d Cong. (1993); see also H.R. 2915, 103d Cong. (1993). The Senate version of the FCAA of 1993 was referred to the Committee on Judiciary on April
29, 1993, and then to the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice on
June 24, 1993, where it died. H.R. 2915, 103d Cong. (1993), available at http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D? ... /temp/-bd-E5:@@@L--bss/dl03query.htm
(last visited Mar. 15, 2001). The House version of the FCAA of 1993 was referred to
the House Committee on Judiciary on August 6, 1993, and then to the Subcommittee
on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations on August 16, 1993, where it
died. Id.
242. Like the FCAA of 1992, the FCAA of 1993 contained limitations on government employees bringing suit as qui tam relators. S. 841 § 2. The whistleblower protection provision of the FCAA of 1993 was identical to the whistleblower protection
provision in the FCAA of 1992. Id. § 4. In contrast to the FCAA of 1992, however,
the FCAA of 1993 would have added two additional sections. First, Section 6 proposed a change to the statute of limitations by requiring an action to be brought
within six years from the date on which the unlawful act occurred. Id. § 6. However,
the six year statute of limitations excluded time periods where a government official,
charged with the authority to act, did not know and could not reasonably be expected
to know about the material facts of the cause of action. Second, Section 7 would have
replaced the Deputy Attorney General with the Assistant Attorney General as the
official with the authority to issue investigative demands. Id.§ 7.
243. S. 841 § 2.
244. Id. The administrative steps parallel those delineated in the FCAA of 1992.
245. S. 841, 103d Cong., § 2.
246. H.R. 2915, 103d Cong. (1993).
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all the necessary and specific facts underlying the material allegations" from (1) a fraud investigation actively pursued by the
government; or (2) from a news media report or congressional
hearing or report if the executive branch was actively pursuing
such investigation before the individual filed his or her complaint.247 In all other respects, the House version paralleled the
Senate version.
The proposed changes in the FCAA of 1993 were more drastic than the changes proposed by the FCAA of 1992. As mentioned above, the Senate version would have allowed the
government to dismiss a private individual from a lawsuit only if
the material substance of the relator's lawsuit was derived from
an open and active government fraud investigation, or the relator learned of the information in the course of his or her employment and failed to take required administrative steps.248 A
private individual who gets information of a fraudulent activity
from a government investigation is obviously not the type of qui
tam relator contemplated by the FCA. Therefore, it seems redundant to allow the government to dismiss an individual under
these circumstances. Also, the use of the words "derived from"
would likely have required all of the material allegations in the
relator's complaint to come from the government investigation
in order for the government to dismiss-a definite step in the
wrong direction.
Like the FCAA of 1992 provisions, and the Senate provisions
of the FCAA of 1993, the House version would have eliminated
only those private individuals who obtained information already
known by and in the presence of the government. However,
these provisions would have created an avenue for significant
abuse of the qui tam provisions. The purpose of the qui tam
provisions is not to encourage such opportunistic behavior, but
rather to reward individuals who "mak[e] it possible for the
United States, in an appropriate action to recover against peo249
ple who ha[ve] perpetrated frauds against the United States.'
C. Health Care Claims Guidance Act

In contrast to the FCAA of 1992 and 1993, the Health Care
Claims Guidance Act ("HCCGA"), sponsored by Representa247.
248.
249.

Id. § 2.
S. 841 § 2.
89 CONG. REC. 10845 (1943) (emphasis added).
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tive McCollum, 2 5 ° did not favor the qui tam relator. This bill
would have added a new provision to the Act setting forth rules
for certain actions based on health care claims. First, the
HCCGA sought to prohibit actions from being brought under
the FCA if (1) the alleged damages to the government were not
material; (2) the claim submitted relied on (and correctly used)

erroneous information supplied by a federal agency or agent, or
relied on (and correctly applied) written statements of federal
policy provided by the federal agency or agent that affected such

claim; or (3) the alleged violator was in substantial compliance
with a model compliance plan issued by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services.

1

Second, the HCCGA would have

changed the standard of proof from "a preponderance of the
evidence" to "clear and convincing evidence. '252 Third, the
HCCGA would have defined certain terms, including "claim, "253
"damages, ' 254 "federally funded health care program '255 and

"material amount." The HCCGA explained that definition of

"material" would follow the definition used by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA"). 56 Further-

more, an amount would have been considered "material" only if
it exceeded a proportion of the total amounts of the claims submitted by or on behalf of the alleged violator to the same federally funded health care program, and for the same calendar year,

as the claim upon which the action was based.

7

Lastly, the bill

explained the special circumstances under which claims would

250. H.R. 3523, 105th Cong. (1998). Although there was strong support for this
bill in the 105th Congress, the bill has not yet been re-introduced. An effort to pass
the identical bill introduced in the Senate, S. 2007, was abandoned after the Deputy
Attorney General issued his memorandum, discussed above, on the appropriate use
of the false claims act in health care related matters. Perhaps this memorandum is
also the reason for the loss of support for H.R. 3523.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. 'Claim' was defined as "a claim (as defined in section 3729(c)) made with
respect to a federally funded health care program." Id.
254. 'Damages' were defined as "the amount of overpayment made by the United
States Government with respect to a claim." Id.
255. 'Federally funded health care program' was defined as "a program that provides health benefits, whether directly, through the purchase of insurance, or otherwise, that is established under - (A) title XVIII, XIX, or XXI of the Social Security
Act, or (B) title 10, United States Code." Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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be aggregated and how a material amount of damages would be
measured if the claims were aggregated. 8
One good idea in the HCCGA was the proposal to prohibit
actions where an alleged wrongdoer could show that he relied
upon erroneous federal information.259 If an individual seeks
out federal advice in order to assure compliance and relies on
such advice, then that individual should be protected from subsequent action. This proposal is a good way to diminish the vulnerability of providers as a result of misinterpreting complicated
regulations. It seems only appropriate to insulate individuals
from liability in situations where the government itself issued
erroneous advice.
In contrast, there are a number of illogical proposals suggested in the HCCGA. First, as mentioned above, the HCCGA
sought to prohibit actions where the alleged damages to the government were not material. 260 The HCCGA mentions that the
AICPA definition of "material" would have been used as the
standard of measure. 261 Furthermore, an amount would have
only been considered "material" if it exceeded a proportion of
the total amount of claims submitted by the alleged violator to
the same health care program for the same year as the claim
upon which the action is based.262 Based on this interpretation,
the government might be prohibited from bringing an action because an amount is not proportionally "material" but is nevertheless in excess of a million dollars. Using the AICPA
materiality standard of 10%, an entity that had billed Medicare
for $10 million in a given year would not be liable under the
258. Claims could be aggregated only if acts or omissions causing the alleged damages were part of a pattern of related acts or omissions by such person. Id. If damages were aggregated, whether a material amount existed would be determined by
comparing the aggregate damages to the total claims submitted by the alleged violator
to the same federally funded health care program, but for each of the calendar years
in which any claim upon which the aggregate damages were based was submitted. Id.
259. See id. § 2.
260. Id.
261. Kohler's Dictionaryfor Accountants explains with regard to 'materiality' that
"[siome accountants have endeavored to establish standards of materiality by rules of
thumb, as, by requiring that any item or item class the money amount of which is 5%
or more of total assets or 10% or more of a net income appear as an integral detail of
a financial statement." KOHLER'S DICTIONARY FOR ACCOUNTANTS 323 (6th ed.
1983). However, the explanation recognized that "[s]uch a rule, however, leaves unsolved the problem of smaller items whose disclosure may be essential, regardless of
their size, as where certain items, now of minor importance, may develop into major
items with the passage of time or upon the happening of events now contingent or
even unknown." Id. at 323-324.
262. H.R. 3523, 105th Cong. § 2.
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FCA unless the damages to the government exceeded the "material" amount of $1 million. Considering the number of potential violators, such a prohibition could cost the government
astronomical amounts of money in a given year, and guilty individuals could escape prosecution. The government should be
entitled to recover any amount of money it wrongfully paid out,
and should not be limited in doing so by a "materiality"
requirement.
The proposal also sought to protect individuals who are in
substantial compliance with a model compliance plan issued by
the Secretary of HHS.263 This proposal creates the potential for
' 264
guilty individuals to hide behind a "model compliance plan
even if that individual is deliberately engaging in fraudulent
acts. Such individuals should not be able to disclaim wrongdoing with the existence of a compliance plan.
Finally, the HCCGA would have revised the standard of
proof from a "preponderance of the evidence" to "clear and
convincing evidence. ' 265 Generally, "Congress has chosen the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard when it has created
substantive causes of action for fraud. ' 266 One court explained:
"Because the Act neither requires a showing of fraudulent intent nor is punitive in nature, we find no justification for applying a burden of proof higher than preponderance of the
evidence. ' 267 In contrast, the "clear and convincing" standard is
generally used when there is a potential deprivation of a due
process right involved.268 Although proponents of this amendment would likely argue that the heightened standard is justified
in light of the confusion and complexity of the regulations at
hand, the differentiation of the burden of proof standard in
FCA cases would create a dangerous precedent. Certainly,
there are other regulations that are equally complex. If this ar263. Id.
264. Model compliance plans are created by the OIG to serve as a guide for
health care providers to reduce fraud and abuse in federal health care programs. The
OIG has issued a number of model compliance plans in order to help health care
entities to correct and prevent fraudulent activities in specified areas and to help reduce the risk of criminal and civil liability.
265. H.R. 3523, 105th Cong. § 2.
266. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286, 111 S. Ct. 654, 659 (1991) (citing 31
U.S.C. § 3731(c) (False Claims Act); 42 C.F.R. § 1003.114(a) (1989) (Medicare and
Medicaid fraud under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a)) (citations omitted).
267. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Hester, 765 F.2d 723, 728 (8th Cir. 1985).
268. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (requiring a 'clear and
convincing' standard to be used before the state can terminate paternity rights).
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gument warrants merit for the FCA, others may argue that there
is a similar need to make an exception for other non-health care
regulations. Furthermore, a heightened burden would likely result in a significant increase in litigation because the government
would have a more difficult burden to meet. Thus, changing the
burden of proof in FCA cases would be inconsistent with both
legislative and judicial precedent.
D.

The Legislature's Role in Improving the FCA

One way to change the application of the FCA is to amend
the Act. As indicated by the number of amendments to the Act
since its enactment in 1863, there has been a consistent need for
changes and clarifications. Nevertheless, due to the failure of all
proposals to amend the Act since 1986, there is a strong resistance to taking this approach again. Although there are some
good intentions behind the congressional proposals over the
past few years, many of the bills suggest changes that do not
coincide with the original legislative purpose of the Act, and/or
would not fix the current problems. However, certain changes
could be made to harmonize the application of the Act with its
intended purpose.
In addition to the interpretation problems with the public disclosure jurisdictional bar discussed above, there is also a general
outrage regarding the severity of the civil monetary penalties.
Two of the primary reasons providers are unlikely to litigate the
merits of their case are (1) the imposition of severe civil monetary penalties, and (2) the possibility of exclusion from all federal health care programs. Although the Act is supposed to
have a remedial effect,2 6 9 the severity of the penalties seem to
indicate a punitive purpose.270 Reducing the civil monetary penalty amount is one way to minimize the harsh effects of the
FCA. Perhaps the damages could be measured proportionally
against the monetary loss to the government. For example, instead of having a set penalty amount for each fraudulent claim,
the amount could be measured as a set percentage of the unlawfully obtained amount. Hypothetically, if the civil monetary
penalty was set at 50% of the damages sustained by the government, and $100,000 was determined to be the damages amount,
269. See United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Ore. 1885).
270. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
120 S.Ct. 1858, 1869 (2000) (stating that damages under the FCA are punitive in
nature).
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then the guilty party would owe the government $50,000 in penalties, plus treble damages. The fixed percentage would be established in accordance with what would effectively deter
individuals from engaging in the unlawful behavior.271 Or, the
Act could set a threshold above which the amount accumulated
in civil monetary penalties becomes "grossly disproportional" to
the underlying crime.272 For example, a civil monetary penalty
amount in excess of 80% of the unlawful amount taken from the
government could be considered "grossly disproportional." The
Act could also be amended to eliminate civil monetary penalties
in cases where an entity alleges the crime was committed by a
"rogue employee" and can show (1) it had a respectable compliance plan in place, 273
and (2) it had no knowledge of the alleged
activity.
fraudulent
Probably more daunting than civil monetary penalties is the
possibility of exclusion from federal health care programs. A
higher standard for permissible exclusion would help equalize
the balance of power between the DOJ and providers. Currently, section 1128(b)(7) of the Social Security Act authorizes
the Secretary of DHHS and the OIG to exclude individuals or
entities from federal health care programs if such individuals or
entities submit false or fraudulent claims to the government.274
Thus, if an individual or entity submits one fraudulent claim,
that individual or entity faces the possibility of exclusion from
all federal health care programs. Instead, the law could require
that permissive exclusion only applies if the violator is found
guilty of a certain percentage of the claims in issue as compared
with all the claims submitted in a given year. Alternatively, the
law could require a set monetary threshold above which permissive exclusion would be applicable.275 Similarly, the law could
271. For an excellent discussion about how complete and optimal deterrence is
calculated, see TIMOTHY S. JOST & SHARON L. DAVIES, The Empire Strikes Back: A
Critique of the Backlash Against Fraudand Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239,
266-293 (1999).
272. In a recent Supreme Court opinion, the Court found that a forfeiture of
$357,144 in a case where the defendant tried to take the money out of the country
without reporting it would be grossly disproportional to the crime and would not pass
muster under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. United States v.
Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2030 (1998); cf. Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488
(1997); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
273. JosT & DAVIES, supra note 271, at 315.
274. Criteria for Implementing Permissive Exclusion Authority Under Section
1128(b)(7) of the Social Security Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 67,392 (1997).
275. However, a set monetary threshold fails to account for proportional violations among the guilty parties.
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require a finding of two separate civil judgments against an individual or entity before that individual or entity could be permissively excluded from the program. The FCA could also provide
for certain safe harbors in order to protect "honest" mistakes.
For example, as suggested by the HCCGA, the Act could prohibit suits from being brought against individuals who "reasonably" relied on erroneous governmental advice.
Regarding the qui tam provisions, the Act should be amended
to require the relator to specifically plead in the complaint how
he or she is an "original source" of the information that serves
as the basis for the allegations in the complaint. Also, the Act
should be amended to allow complete judicial discretion as to
the amount the relator should receive in a given case. The
amount of the award should be based on the significance of the
relator's role in uncovering the fraudulent activity.276 As de-

scribed in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3), the court should consider the
role of the relator "in advancing the case to litigation and any
relevant circumstances pertaining to the violation [of the FCA]"
when determining an appropriate amount.
CONCLUSION

The FCA is a powerful weapon in the war against health care
fraud and abuse. When used appropriately, it is undeniably beneficial to society as a whole. However, when the Act is used to
force unwitting providers into settlement and is interpreted inconsistently with its intended purpose, we must recognize the
need for change. The executive, legislative and judicial branches
of the government all play significant roles in influencing the
FCA. The executive branch, as the enforcer of the law, needs to
use fair and consistent tactics when using the FCA. The legislative branch, as the creator of the law, needs to amend the Act so
that it is equitably applied. The judicial branch, as the interpreter of the law, needs to decipher the public disclosure jurisdictional bar in a manner consistent with the intended purpose
of the Act-which is to prevent parasitic lawsuits by individuals
who offer no service to the government. By working together,
the three branches of our government can remedy the problems
276. On February 10, 1994, Representative Duncan introduced a bill, H.R. 3848,
to limit the relator's amount to $1 million. However, the bill never generated significant support, and died on August 18, 1994, in the Subcommittee on Administrative
Law and Governmental Relations. H.R. 3848, 103rd Cong. (1994) available at http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/ D? ... /temp/-bdZb4B:@@@L--/bss/dl03query.htm
(last visited Mar. 15, 2001).
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that still exist in the FCA. Individually, each branch has taken
steps in the right direction. However, with a cooperative effort,
we may hopefully start to notice significant progress towards
improvement.
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